The cultural study of music: a theoretical and methodological introduction by Bradley, Dick
\ ~ V I ., fV - .._.. 
Iii§ CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY 
'§ CULTURAL STUDIES 
The University of Birmingham, P.O. Box 363, Birmingham 015 2TT 
Stencilled Occasional Paper 
THE CULTUI'.AL STUDY OF i1U!:iiC 
by 
Dicl: Bro.dle:r 
G"'!::1"'·:-al Series: SP No. 61 
b/1 
THE CULTURAL STUDY OF MUSIC:
A theoretical and methodological introduction
Dick Bradley
Page
Introduction 1
% Sqid^  ^cadiiional Views o£ 2
2. The Classical Sociologists 10
3. Shepherd and Adorno *4
V Snmg Conclusions <*9
-  1 -
Introduction
The terra "Cultural Study of Music" is, for convenience, already pre­
sented in the title of this paper. I am not, however of the opinion that 
such a study can be constituted by defining "cultural studies" a priori 
and then making up its musical variety as if by recipe. I believe that 
the study of music as part of culture (musical practices as the socially- 
situated practices of concrete persons and groups) is an integral part 
of a true "cultural-studies" field or discipline and, as-.such, will have 
something to offer at the level of method and definition to the field as 
a whole. In other words "cultural studies" cannot be applied to music; 
it must be generated out of a concern for music, among other things, and 
ought to bear the marks of this genesis as essential, definitive features 
of its existence as an intellaciual project.
Taking my cue from some of the existing inter-disciplinary studies of 
literature, filr. TV etc, which use the'"tools" of political ecnomy, sociology, 
linguistics, semiology*, psychology and so on, and which try to fusd these 
into a consistent method, I approached my problem at first by setting out 
to survey the existing sociology, economics, aesthetics etc of music in • 
general terms - that is to read and digest a lot of "key" books. . Simul­
taneously I was trying to build up my knowledge of "pop facts", especially 
with regard to Britain, and to the 1950s, in particular. I saw the two 
projects as temporarily separate, and hoped to be able to fuse them later.
This was partly wrong - in that a theoretically-informed appropriation of 
the pop history-books and periodicals, (where I was rummaging for my "facts") 
was eminently necessary; I tended to view all these histories as hopeless 
in their approach and at the same time authoritative in their "content", - 
an error easy to see but difficult to avoid. I hope I have since begun to 
correct it.
Here my aim is to set out the results of that first part of my studies 
which consisted of reading the famous sociologists, "cultural critics" and 
to a lesser extent, aestheticians, and others, whose works constitiite the 
field-in-the-making of "cultural study of music", if any such thing exists.
The unsatisfactory but necessary vagueness and elasticity in this formulation 
can only be finally justified if I use the insights gained to illuminate my 
objects of study later, so I well spend no time justifying it here.
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I would like, however, to apologise in advance for untidiness of 
classification. Writers like Adorno, or Weber, or Shepherd, are not 
easily pigeonholed, but for convenience I deal with each only once, 
and it will inevitably seem to someone that I do so in the wrong 
place or places. ‘This arises from the origin of this paper - as a 
sort of work-in-progress report - and I have not felt it useful or 
necessary to recast the whole, although, of course, I could be wrong.
1. .Some traditional views of music
The problems of what music is, what it’hieans", what unifies different 
practices from different continents or epochs as ''musical1' (if anything), 
what the relationships are between music and other areas of social life 
(or human practices, or whatever) - these have vexed and tormented a 
terrifyingly-long list of philosophers, critics and social scientists.
The difficulties, extend from small but tantalising ones of, for example, 
terminology, to enormous ones related to our very concepts of the "human", 
and the "social". I can make no claims at present for the approach which 
I use here except that it seems to me to be a validl^- -drawn analogue to 
the approach to fiction, poetry, TV etc which has become characteristic 
of "cultural studies" - namely, to see the objects of study as human 
practices (and their objectification in artefacts), and to understand that 
the appropriation of artefacts and ideas by the readers/viewers/listeners, 
is no less of an essential dimension of the practice as a whole than is 
the "deliberate" element in production - i.e. composition, authorship etc. 
To put it another way, I do not intend to decontextualise songs, singers, 
records, "styles" "periods" or anything else except in the sense in which 
I can justify a respect for their "relative autonomies", as I will explain 
below. I will see music as part of "musical life", and musical life as 
part of social life, or cultural totality, and I will see all these as 
developing and changing, as in no way static. If this approach contributes 
anything to the general aesthetic and philosophical debrates, it will be by 
leaving them behind for a time, and looking at other aspects of music and 
musical life not usually dealt with in the aestheticians' treatises.
First however I must deal briefly with a few writers who do consider 
music at this generalised level, and suggest how and v/here their approaches 
leave me dissatisfied.
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(A) The Aestheticians. The two authorities in this field, the ones all-- --------— ----  <]
the other writers refer to respectfully, are L.B. Meyer and S. Langer .
An intelligent critique of their views, which are distinct but similar2is to be found in the first three chapters of ''Whose Music1' . Briefly 
I will suggest my own view of what is fundamentally inadequate about these 
works. Meyer argues that music is not "its own meaning", as some say, 
but instead has a relationship to "psychological constants" which enables
3it to express "emotions'1 . Langer, arguing somewhat differently, arrives 
at the not dissimilar view that music "actually reflects the morphology 
of feeling" (i960, p.238). These writers have a certain familiarity with 
psychological theory, certainly, but the ideal listening-subject they 
implicitly posit, the person to whom this "expression" or "reflection" 
communicates, is never situated socially, historically or in any other 
way. The person has no sex, race or age, no beliefs, no technical know­
ledge of music, only a set of organs and responses. Of course Meyer and 
Langer are to sophisticated to leave the matter here. They both recognise 
that certain conventions expressive within one culture, or group, are 
meaningless to another. They recognise that "people", not;bundles of 
experimentally-verifiable response-mechanisms alone, listen to music.
But the recognition is external to the core of their argument, it is a 
parenthesis inserted as insurance against simplistic criticism. It does 
not affect their central thesis, which is that there is something "given" 
called a "work", and that in all works there is something encoded so 
successfully that it has ceased to depend for its meaning on the particu­
larities of audience. Music speaks a "universal language" of the "emotions" 
and any development and change in it is a technical matter relating to the 
expression of further emotional nuances. If pressed, these writers would 
agree, as I have pointed out, that the listener has to be placed and dated 
socially or culturally before his/her listening-response can even begin to 
be predicted. But what ms needed is an approach which puts this insight 
at the centre of its study, and theirs simply does not qualify by this test. 
Many other criticisms could be made of these authors, but that is not my 
purpose here. I will discuss the ideas of the unalterable "work", the idea 
that music expresses "emotions", always and only, and other such theories 
and assumptions in another context.
A peculiarly British and "empiricist" version of the view that music 
"expresses emotions" is to be found in "The Language of Music" by Deryck 
Cooke . Having dealt rather perfunctorily with theoretical questions m
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Chapter One, he arrives at a view which systematically relates "terms 
of musical vocabulary" to particular emotions. He assembles a mass of 
detailed evidence for his view, which is essentially as follows: the
composer has a feeling, and reaches, apparently instinctively, for a 
musical expression of it. He need not know it, but what he actually 
reaches for is only a convention, or a "term in a musical vocabulary".
The relation between "Tonic-Dominant" melodic lines and "joy" is one 
of the chief examples Cooke uses. Now Cooke is not sure about the 
degree to v/hich the conventions of Western "tonal" music are derived from 
"natural" or "physiological" factors, if at all, and in fact he suggests 
that they are so-derived while admitting that other cultures have apparently 
derived different ones. Any "derivation", in either case, would seem to 
have been part of a process in v/hich other, non-physiological, factors 
played a fundamental role too. But there is a bigger problem than this 
one in Cooke's argument. Some of the "cultures" with such different 
music from the "western tonal" type do not simply hear "joy" where "we" 
with our conventions consciously or unconsciously "in mind", hear only 
wailing, say, (or hear no "emotional expression" at all, but only scrat­
ching noises, for example); these so-different cultures do not, in many 
cases, think in terms of music-expressing-emotion at all. Their musical 
practices play very different roles in the social life. The very best 
evidence on this question is John Blacking's first-hand account of Venda 
music (from a small part of Southern Africa) v/ith its ritual, celebratory, 
and educational functions, v/ith its predominantly collective mode of per­
formance in which individualised emotion hardly figures, and so on. It 
is clear from Blacking's book^, and from the researches of the "ethno-g
musicologists" , that we must not think of all musical practices in terms 
really applicable (& then not unproblematically) to western'bomposed" and 
"tonal" music alone - a barely ^00 yeais old , and quite conceivably dying 
"tradition".
(B) The Marxists. The "totalising" ambitions of "orthodox" Marxist writers 
(and some less orthodox) have on occasion led to contributions on these 
questions from v/ithin marxism. The major works of Adorno, in this field,
I will deal with, at length, later. But here v/hat I want to do is to show 
what a lacuna musical understanding is in Marxism, and v/hat rubbish some­
times results when Marxist writers try to bridge or hide this lacuna rather 
than seriously to attempt to remove it. Both over-abstract and aliistorical
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notions of what music is, akin to those of Meyer et al, and ethnocentric,
pseudo-evolutionist notions about the ’'superiority51 of the European
classics over all other music (except, for some writers, a certain amount
of "naive" folk-music) are to be found too often for comfort whenever the
Marxists touch on the question. The best examples of the first error I
have found are surely Ernst Fischer and Christopher Caudwell, but before
I discuss them I would like to offer a quotation from Maxim Gorki as a
warning to those who regard the second as rather academic or irrelevant
here (since after all I am supposed to be writing about modern pop, not
primitive tribal rituals, though they are all very well in their way?).
7 "Written in Italy in 1 9 2 8, it was Gorki ' s  reaction to listening to some 
modern dance music on the radio:
"This is radio - one of the greatest discoveries of science, 
one of the secrets it has wrenched from ostensibly mute nature.
The radio in the neighbourhood hotel is entertaining the world 
of the fat men, the v/orld of the marauders, conveying to them
over the air a new foxtrot performed by a Negro orchestra....
In all the luxuriant cabarets of the "cultured" countries, fat 
men and women are lewdly wriggling their thighs to its rhythm, 
wallowing in obscenity, simulating the proceative act......
Love is the basis of culture, hunger is the basis of civiliza­
tion..... But along come the obese marauder, the parasite who
lives on the labour of others... and tramples with his fat feet 
over all that has been spun from the finest nerve-tissue of the 
great poets, the enlighteners of labouring humanity.... A inhuman
bass voice roars English words, one is deafened by a prodigious 
horn that is reminiscent of the shriek of a maltreated camel, a 
drum thunders, a pestilential pipe squeals, and one's ears are 
rent by the croacking of snuffling of a saxophone."
Elsewhere he adds,
"It is an evolution from the beauty of the minuet and the ani­
mated passion of the waltz, to the lewdness of the foxtrot and 
the convulsions of the Charleston, from Mozart and Beethoven to 
the jazz - music of the Negroes, who no doubt laugh up their 
sleeves as they see their masters, the whites, evolving to that 
savage state from which the American Negroes have risen, and which 
they are leaving farther and farther behind"
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and
"He, the fat man does not need woman as a friend and companion; 
to him she is a mere pastime.... Nor does he need woman as a 
mother, because, to him, although he loves power, children are 
a nuisance..... foxtrots have become indispensable to him, for 
your fat man is a poor male. For him, love is a dissipation, 
it is increasingly becoming a perversion of the imagination..... 
In the v/orld of the fat men, homosexual love is spreading epi­
demically. The evolution of the fat men is degeneration."
This passage does not really deserve serious analysis here. However 
it serves the purpose of alerting us to the existence of a theory which 
sees popular music as the return or revival of "corporeality", sexual 
significations and effects, and other qualities, on western culture, due 
to "the Negro" , specifically the American Negro, who is considered a 
repository of these qualities in particular. Some writers use this 
theory to damn popular music, some to praise it, but it is a racist 
theory in either case. If "corporeality" and "sex" do indeed prove to 
be prominent and essential aspects of contemporary popular music in 
any sense, it is certainly not possible to simplistically account for 
this in terms of "race", however conceived.
Gorki is a poor marxist. But unfortunately, writers of greater 
sobriety duplicate his error of believing that their Marxism gives them 
a right and duty to "totalise" even when it means passing judgement on 
things they know little about. An example of this is the important 
English marxist Christopher Caudwell, who in his attempt to define theg
"organisation of the arts" presents some very generalised ideas about music 
v/hich are embarrassingly similar to those of Meyer.
"What does poetry become, if all external reference is eliminated, 
in the way that all value-judgements are eliminated from a 
scientific argument to make it become logistic? Poetry becomes 
"meaningless" sound, but sound full of emotional reference - in 
other words, music; (his emphasis) and music, like logistic, 
is translatable and universal."
And on the next page Caudwell writes:
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"In fact it is music, not poetry, which is as abstract and 
generalised with regard to subjective reality as mathematics 
is to external reality. In music the environment sinks away, 
the ego inflates and all the drama takes place within its 
walls. Mathematics is externally abstract and generalised; 
music internally so."
Although Caudwell may turn out to be not without relevance to debates 
about the nature and distinctness of the "arts", this line of argument 
seems to me to be unjustifiable in the straightforward sense that he is 
clearly trying to relate a view of poetry which is very much his own 
(and argued for in detail throughout the book) with a view of music 
which is lifted more or less uncritically and insensitively from his 
general reading.
oWith Ernst Fischer v/e come to a different case , a marxist who takes 
some trouble to consult the "classics", but who still flounders when he 
faces the question of integrating music into a scheme of "totality". His 
scheme is not simply one of dogmas out of Marx, it is derived from a study 
of the Visual arts and literature; but for this very reason it cannot help 
but fit badly when applied to objects outside of its experience. Further­
more its inadequacy in this respect rebounds upon Fischer's Ihrxia:-,striking 
at itn surface of richness and sophistication and exposing a normature or 
prescriptive streak which he is better able to hide when writing of liter­
ature and painting, about which he knows so much more. Fischer begins his 
section on music in "The Necessity of Art" by taking Stravinsky to task 
for his assertion that there exists a "purely musical" logic which really 
has nothing to do with the social "setting" of composition, the composer's 
ideas, even the particular occasion giving rise to a work. Fischer finds 
this inconceivable, and approvingly quotes Hegel insisting that music does 
have a content apart from its arrangement of sounds. This content, says 
Hegel, is not one of abstract emotions (joy, sorrow) but one "closely 
related to the particular character of the emotion roused, so that the mode 
of expression will, or should, inevitably assert itself \ri.th essential 
differences according to the varied nature of the content". Again, in a 
generalised and vague way, music and emotional expression have been linked
together as though this expression were only and always the "content" of 
10music. Having got to this point, Fischer leaves Hegel's much more complex 
argument, and goes on to make assertions about the particularity of emotional
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states expressed in Beethoven's works, assertions for which he offers no 
support. It may be true that the ''loneliness11 of the late chamber music 
is "not the loneliness of the pious hermit of a peasant snowed up in his 
mountain hut; it is the new urban loneliness......," but can it be proved?
Indeed is it conceivable at all that this "urban loneliness" is present 
in the resulting music each and every time the score is reconstituted by 
performers, and present in a way which listeners can group without being 
previously informed, as it were? Within Fischer's conceptual scheme the 
answer to these questions has to be No. His own interpretative opinions, 
though grounded, perhaps, in some technical knowledge, can never convincingly 
double-up as statements of "objective" authority. He has no final argument 
against the listener who hears nothing of the kind in the music in question 
and while he poses the question in this way he never will have.
The strength of Fischer's approach is in his linking of (historical)
social forces and developments to new and original "forms" and "resources"
in music, but his weakness is in this linking too - in the fact that he
cannot specify anything much about the particular nature of the links.
His argument founders on the apparent inaccessibility of musical "meaning"
which in turn flows, in my opinion from his search for something timelessly
and totally "within" the work. He has not dug deeply enough; in particular
he has not considered that musical meaning might be a contingent or changing
thing, to which audiences and others contribute as well as composers. As
with many of the writers I am considering Fischer would no doubt grant
ilv principle the truth of this criticism. What he does not do is make it
an integral part of his approach, and this is where his inadequacy lies.
Its cause may be in his fundamental conceptual framework but I think not.
His discussion of the social conditions within which magic can be "real"
and magically-associated art meaningful, earlier in the book, suggests
that he can think in these terms within the areas he knows well. Once
again as with Caudwell, the real obstacle is schemas, a priori constructs,
the over-eagerness to "place" each phenomena within a unified marxist
framework, - even though it requires that one first wrings its neck, as
11Sartre puts it in his polemic agaxnst such methods.
It is in fact not conceivable that, say, Beethoven's Vth "means" 
the same to modern listeners, however "trained" in the tradition "within 
which" it was written/composed/first performed, as it did to the audience 
on that first night on the 22nd of December, 1o0 8. Listeners are an
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essential part of the production of music, not merely receivers of some­
thing already fixed. The music is only more than ''meaningless sounds1' 
if it is apprehended as such by listeners and only such reception makes
the composer/performer-etc-role meaningful in turn. And it is not 
merely hairsplitting to point out that no tv/o audiences are the same.
To take extreme examples the music of the Medieval Church in England 
has no "more"^meaning to a modern englishman than to a German, and 
neither of them will be able to hear it without "placing" or "associating” 
it in ways learnt in our time (or failing to, and judging the music 
"meaningless" in consequence). Not only, then, do different cultures 
accord different sorts of meanings and functions, to musical practices, 
but the continuity that exists even within a society over a. period is 
only a fragile, relative one, and does not justify the notion that any 
piece of music can have an unchanging effect on (or meaning to) its 
listeners. I will return to the question of continuity later.
Fischer does have some interesting speculations to offer - on old 
church music, on dance music, military marches, etc, on the arrival of 
"conflict" in Western music during the period of its "secularisation" 
(1600 and later), on the highbrow-lowbrow divisions origin in the 19th 
century when a new middle-class (and later working class) musical public 
grew up along the old aristocratic one. But it is not without signifi­
cance that these suggestions are really in no way different from the 
small-change of "social context" remarks in many a non-marxist, academic 
music history.
In the last part of his argument Fischer is concerned to define 
"formalism" in music, a recurrent theme in "Communist" criticism 
especially during the "Stalinist" period. His definition is, once 
again, highly conventional: he writes of virtuosity for its own sake,
cross imitation and slavish archaism, the forcible removal of warmth 
and feeling as in "neo-classicism" and "intellectualised" revivals of 
old religious music. Despite Fischer's eschewment of state censorship 
he has arrived here at normative principles, "Thou shalt not" and "Thou 
shalt". He holds up works of Eister as models, and implicitly, those of 
the prafeitionenPf neo-classicism and religious revivals (Stravinsky, 
Hindermith, Reger?) as examples of paths to be avoided. We do not have 
to espouse liberal and romantic ideas of artistic freedom to understand 
that the insubstantiality of most of his argument cannot provide any basis
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for this sort of conclusion. Its sources must then be elsev/here, either 
in an apriorism of an aesthetic sort or in enslavement to a political 
doctrine despite its failure to provide the substantial categories that 
are lacking.
2 . The ’’Classical11 Sociologists.
If the marxist tradition has not been very fruitful in attempting 
to move .beyond the ideas of music as "meaningless" or "intranslatable", 
then what of the major figures of the "Sociology of Music" as a subdis­
cipline of general sociology? Again there were depressingly few substantial 
contributions here, but several of them do have considerable interest 
and importance. l/hat we find running like a thread through these is a 
concern over the character and site of the autonomy of musical practices. 
Some writers believe that sociology has nothing to offer to the under­
standing of the "music itself", hov/ever defined and can simply set up 
a view of the context of social actions surrounding an autonomous musi­
cal production. Others believe that music must be seen as articulating 
in some way, its social and psychological origins and circumstances, and 
likewise that its use by listeners must be viewed as a social practice 
related to other practices and determinations in their social life, and 
not simply derived from what the music is supposed to "be saying".
/~These authors vary in their opinions of whether anything "immanent" 
in music exists^/. This second view has tended to be more fruitful of 
hypotheses and insights than the first, and it is where such a view is 
combined with some musicological expertise and interest that the very 
best contributions to my putative "cultural study of music" are to be 
found. Specifically I am referring to the work of John Shepherd and to a 
number of books and essays by Adorno. Before I deal with these writersi 
however, I will present a survey of the development of the sociology 
of music, beginning with the classical sociologists of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries.
Although Conte includes music among the "aesthetic matters" which
he considers legitimate objects of sociological study, it is in the work
of Dilthey that the sociology of music may really be said to begin. His
writings on music are to be found in three major works, all of them unfor-
12tunately not translated into English . I have relied here on K.P. Etzkorn's
11 \
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discussion of these works for the following summary. J  Music, argues
Dilthey, expresses emotions, and nothing else. The expression arises
in the first place out of the relationships of the elements "within the
music" to each other. But the composer is an "unwitting" communicator,
manipulating his technical means without knowing precisely how or why
an expressive whole is formed. Thus certain musical configurations
will turn out, apparently fortuitously, to have "meaning'1', perhaps the
"same meaning" to the composer and the listeners, and to different sets
1k
of listeners. In his studies of the German national character Dilthey 
argues that the "meaning" of-great works like some of Bach's is in fact 
the expression of "national feelings", of the "depths of Germanic fantasy". 
Thus what the composer is unwittingly doing is "striking a chord" as it 
were, which will resonate among all listeners sharing the elements of 
nationality and social conditioning;;which have made the composer what 
he is. (Dilthey is the one who uses "he" throughout, not me). However, 
he rejects the concept "Volksseele" (soul of the people)which was to be 
turned to Nazi purposes in the next century) arguing that the meaning 
of terms like "nation" can "only be expressed analytically" by adding 
together separate analyses of many aspects and cannot be presented as 
an intangible unifier working through these aspects to realise itself.
Thus we find at the fountainhead of sociological enquiry into music 
the first statements of several lines of thought which will be evident 
throughout - namely, the belief that music has 'immanent" qualities or 
laws, and the attempt to formulate the problem of how it can then be 
said to express, embody, or indeed do, anything "social". The problem 
is still with us - viz, for example, "Profane Culture" by Paul Willis, 
ps 198-20315.
Georg Simmel, another of the major figures of early German sociology 
wrote one major work on music as well as a few bits and pieces later in 
his lifetime. His "Psychological and Ethnological Studies in Music"'"’, 
is a remarkable work, expressing a central thesis which, coming from the 
writer^1 fiolletti has called "the German Bergson", is remarkably materialist 
in tendency. Opposing Darwin's theory that music originates in sexuality 
as unsupported by serious evidence, Simmel suggests that music begins as 
speech "exaggerated by emotion in the direction of rythm and modulation". 
This becomes art-music, however, only when the spontaneity of the simple
shriek of pain or shout of joy is intercepted by rules - in other words 
an "objectivity" enters the process. Different sets of rules correspond 
to different social settings, and produce different kinds of music.
Because music is, in this view "a sociopsychological and not a psychic" 
expression , its appreciation depends on a (socialised) familarity with 
its conventions. Simmel considers music to express, unproblematically, 
the "Volksseele" of its society; once again, however, he does not use 
this term with the natiohalistic connotations it later acquires - but 
only in contrast to the Darwinian view of music as expressing natural 
"drives". Once again, then, with Simmel, we have a view of music as a 
social practice, and we have a rendering of the idea that "music expresses 
emotions". Also Simmel offers a clue to what is to become Weber's more 
systematic scheme of musical development - namely the:iules‘! which inter­
cept spontaneity and which Weber names as "rationalisation".
Max Weber's "The Social and Rational Foundations of Music", although. —  . - - -------  ^g
it is in a sense a large fragment rather than a complete work, is im­
portant as a sort of "locus classicus" of many widely - recurring ideas 
among the sociologists of music, as well as among some critics and his­
torians. "In its broadcast sense Weber's thesis is that Western music 
has peculiar rational properties produced by social factors in Occidental 
development", (write Martihdale & Riedal in their introduction to the 
English translation). He considers the development of notation, and 
the related development of "tonality" as rationalisations of irrational 
materials, while delightedly noting that a flaw or irrationality inherent 
in the major-minor system is in fact the basis of its expressiveness (the 
7th and the chord of the Dominant 7th), and of its variety. The rationa­
lisation in question consists in the selection of certain intervals, and 
the suppression of others, for harmonic purposes, and Weber displays a 
vast erudition in selecting examples from all over the world of this 
process, of its "pentatonic" origins, and of other dissimilar cases.
It is not my purpose here to discuss the pros and cons of his argument 
at a "technical" level, but to point out some of its implications and 
assumptions. Firstly despite Weber's own interest in "exotic" instruments 
and musics, his scheme implicitly asserts the superiority or the tonal, 
noted music of the West over all the other existing types. More rational 
action, more rational thought, and more experimentation and conscious
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modification have gone into this Western music says Weber, than into 
any other. Secondly, insofar as 'Weber comprehends the inter-relatedness 
of notation, instrumental developments, mass production, etc and 
musical developments such as the rise of tonality, he envisages a 
continued development of the same sort in the future. The idea of a 
music which use new techniques to abandon notation and, indeed, to 
abandon a great deal of technical knowledge" and which puts itself 
into a wholly different relation to the rest of the social life of 
its listeners from what which Weber rightly describes as the "middle- 
class" relationship - this is more or less beyond Weber"s grasp. He 
is, despite a "romantic" interest in the "primitive", essentially a 
modern-is-best evolutionist when considering music, a.nd the "modern" for 
him is the 1900 symphonic and operatic moment.
In addition to this study there is a section in one of Paul Honig-
sheim's lectures, quoted in Etzkorn's Introduction to his works cited
above • in which Honigs’neim recalls Weber's interest in the thesis that
Christianity is the root-cause of the peculiarities of Western musical
development. There is, says Weber, very little use of the body in
Christian ritual, in marked contrast to most other religions. This,
combined with the development of mathematics in Medieval and Renaissance
Europe, tended to push music in the direction of "abstract" instrumental
forms for "cerebral" appreciation. 'Whatever the virtues of this thesis
in general, the "non-corporality" of 'Western "art-music" (both pre and
post-Renaissance) is an element in many writings on modern music and on
popular music in particular. A whole school of thought, in effect, sees
first jazz and then rock as the rejection of this central aspect of the 
20Western tradition . This discussion of rationality and non-corporeality 
is yet another strand, then, which recurs in the sociology of music (we 
will find it in Adorno too) and elsewhere, though unfortunately few 
writers use it as a tool for examining and illuminating any concrete 
examples.
Despite ’Weber's own example, his followers in German "Musiksogiologic" 
have tended to follow not this comparative anthropological approach, but 
one based on his central ideas of "value-free" study of "social actions 
and structure". This tendency has not been without its major controversies, 
however, both in relation to value-freedom as an ideal and in relation to 
the proper object of study. With reference to the latter debate, there
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have been those who see the sociology of music as secondary to musico­
logy _ as helping to give the "science of musical interpretation and 
criticism" a social consciousness (of both contexts for, and influences 
on, composition and also behaviour of audiences, preferences, break­
downs by class, sex etc.). Walter Serauky is a leading example of this 
tendency. Adopting a somev/hat similar approach, the influential Alphons 
Silbermann argues that "Musiksoziologic" is simply a branch of sociology 
as a whole, and that it can contribute nothing to the debates about what, 
if anything, is "in" or "immanent to", a musical work. Immanence is, 
he says, a useless category in sociology, since it is the experience
of music which is the true object of sociological investigation, this
21being the socially shared aspect. Adorno has argued strongly against
22this view in his "Theses on the Sociology of Art". As this polemic 
rnakes-clear the debate about what to study and the value-freedom dispute 
are intimately connected, because those who aspire to value-freedom 
regard any qualitative or analytical statement about "music itself" as 
beset hopelessly by "values" of the sort they seek to expunge. In con­
trast Adorno regards musical material as continuous with, of the same 
origin as, the "social process" itself. The separation of "art" from 
"'life" is for Adorno a particular historical attitude, reflected in the 
art of its particular period, but in no way a characteristic inherent to 
art as a whole. Thus any total heteronomy of art in relation to social
life should be rejected by the investigator, whose task it is to dis-
23cover their fundamental inter-relatedness and indeed unity, while 
accepting that a "relative autonomy" v/ill exist.
3 . Shepherd and Adorno
Other major figures of the Sociology of Music are Kurt Blaukopf,
Gerhard Pinthus and Arnold Schering in Europe, and Paul Honigsheim and K.
2kPeter Etzkorn in the U.S. However 1 do not think there is anything to 
be gained from continuity to survey such writers one by one here. I will 
have occasion to refer to some of them, in other contexts, no doubt. Here 
I propose to discuss the contributions ‘of the two writers I named above 
as the most important for a "cultural study of music", namely Shepherd and 
Adorno. And in relation to Adorno I will also make some comments on 
"culture-criticism", and the "’mass-culture" debate as a whole.
In spite of the title of the book, "Whose Music? - A Sociology of 
Musical Languages" to which John Shepherd contributes the 3 first and
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and most substantial chapters, he is really a radical voice in musico­
logy rather than a sociologist. It is undoubtedly this background which
2Senables Shepherd to provide here ' perhaps the most sustained attempt 
in existence to construct a theoretical view of the nature of music as 
social practice, of what different musics "mean" and of how this "mean­
ing” is related to other social meanings. Basing himself on the Berger 
26and Luckmann view of the "social construction of reality", Shepherd
discusses the limitations of Meyer, Longer and others at some length
before presenting his own view of musical meaning, one which is greatly
indebted to the work of McLuhan and others on the history of literacy
and printing, and the nature of the "industrial" world sense " which
27these media help to sustain. He argues that musical works articulate 
the world-sense of their time, as well as particularities of their sep­
arate geneses. This articulation is to be found in the very broad con­
ventions of rhythm, harmonic system and melody and can be exposed by 
scholarship, even though it is not translatable into language. The 
particular genesis of single works/performances is not explained by 
Shepherd, but he implies that any such explanation would have to be 
situated in the framework he proposes.
His examples of Plainchant and early tonal music Eire worked out in 
some detail as evidence for his theory. For example the absence of a 
precisely measured "spatialised" time-sense which is apparent in the 
scores of Medieval music, and which explains its "other-worldliness",
(to modern listeners) says Shepherd, is the product of the sense of time in 
that culture as a whole, while the lack of the tonal "polarity" (the 
"pull" of the "tonic") which we know from "classical" music corresponds 
to certain recurring elements in the verbalised ideologies of the time - 
namely the sense of the world as a set of "centres-without-margins" or 
"interlocking particularities" as noted by Bloch and other historians, 
(These broad assumptions are taken to have been shared by all the classes 
and groups of feudal society). Shepherd's use of the term ideology is 
a somewhat problematic one - he uses it to mean something like "world­
view" implies a visual bias he is trying to correct) rather than to 
imply any truth or falseness in the ideas referred to. Likewise he does 
not claim that the ideology is unified, or disunified, and he does not 
tackle the problem of how "conscious"' of what they were articulating, his 
medieval musicians were. These limitations do not appear very substantial
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with reference to plainchs. t, but they become so when Shepherd moves 
on to tonal music, especially when he begins to suggest a relationship 
between classical music (loth century, predominantly) and the "industrial 
world sense”. In neglecting to consider the time-lag between this music 
and industrial capitalism's period of growth and predominance in Europe, 
as well as totally failing to consider the problem of "class" v/hen speci­
fying a "world-sense", Shepherd renders his approach inadequate despite 
its promise. It is not possible to talk of a "world-sense" corresponding 
to "industry" in the way he talks of a feudal world-sense common to kings 
and serfs alike. Indeed we can see retrospectively that his concept of 
ideology was lame from the beginning. Apart from class, Shepherd ignores 
sex too as a determination affecting musical production. While this may 
correspond to an almost total absence of women in "composition" during 
the periods he discusses, this cannot excuse his omission of any mention 
of the problem.
Furthermore these absences in Shepherd point to a peculiarity of 
his view which is surprising in the light of his starting point in the 
theories of Berger and Luckman. He. writes only of the moment of compo­
ser ship. He insists that musical meaning can only be understood as 
social meaning, created-in-common by producers and listeners, but he 
considers "works" as containing this meaning in something like a fixed 
sense. One can apparently interpret the "Musica Enchiriadis" from its 
score_ (one of his Medieval examples), v/ith little consideration of how, 
v/hen and where it used to be performed, by how many voices, instruments 
if any, etc. “So, despite his theoretical starting point, he ends up 
looking only for the equivalent of Fischer's "'urban loneliness..... in 
the late chamber music" of Beethoven, i.e. still posing the question in 
a pre-sociological and pre-marxist v/ay. / Shepherd acknowledges Marx as an 
influence on his method, but clearly has not gone far enough in this 
appropriation of him, and is not further forward if less dogmatic than 
Fischer with his truncated Hegelianism /. Another peculiarity of Shepherd's 
theory is that, while he espouses "media-determinism" of a McLuhan-like 
variety, in according fundamental causal status to developments in the 
media-techniques, he has very little to say concretely about instruments 
and voices, choirs and orchestras and new inventions of all kinds. The 
"level of the media" which has such importance in his scheme actually
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amounts to the existence and minimal development of notation and very 
little else. While this is clearly important it is equally clear that 
very little development in notation-techniques takes place in Europe 
between 1600 and 1900. say,while musical developments of enormous scope 
take shape in the same period.
Shepherd's chapters are open to a number of other criticisms as 
well as these. However he remains a major contributor in that he has 
shown, in a relatively systematic manner, that we do not have to stand 
like Meyer, Fischer and the others, dumbfounded by the inaccessibility 
of music to verbalisation, and that there is nothing ineffable about 
it which makes fools of all investigators. Finally I should mention 
that he includes in nWhose Music?” a section on the blues, which while 
far from satisfying, is impressive enough to suggest that the methods 
and approaches we can learn from his contribution as a whole, will not 
be without purchase on the somewhat recalcitrant problems of contem­
porary popular music and its social meaning, despite its all too obvious 
differentness from the classical . and pre-classical musics Shepherd deals 
with best.
Before I continue I will summarise here the central strands and 
problems with this survey has highlighted so far: Firstly, the problem
of what, if anything is "immanent” in music and whether the social 
determination of a work's internal relations is a legitimate concept; 
secondly, the problem of the "rational” and the "corporeal/non-corporeal" 
in music, as specifications of possible intersections between the "social” 
in general and the "musically-immanent” in particular; thirdly the problems, 
if any, of assuming that music expresses "emotions", and by implication, 
nothing else; and fourthly, the need to avoid all apriorisms, especially 
ethnocentric theories and "vulgar” evolutionsm, and the imposition of 
totalising schemas generated out of concerns which essentially exclude 
the musical, such as Fischer's or Caudwells.
With the towering contribution of Adorno to the social-scientific 
and Marxist study of music we enter the realm of a "great debate" about 
the quality and direction of contemporary culture as a whole. The exis­
tence of a world-wide working-class, of more or less monopolistic indus­
tries producing "cultural goods" of increasing "leisure-time” throughout
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populations, and other factors, are all taken to cohspire to "level1', 
"vulgarise", commercialise and generally degrade the culture of con­
temporary capitalist societies. This is one side of the debate - and 
roughly speaking, it represents Adorno's view. On the other side are 
assorted "pluralists" who believe that the benefits of mass-literacy 
outweigh all the disadvantages, that the availability of cheap cultural-hhaf (‘Aifi.'vtior reducation can cor":
+ ~,ie
zive
commodities of all kinds is in itself a "good thing", and^contemporary
culture / this is the more optimistic version of another theo.ry which
believes that only education hajs any chance, but suspects that the tidal
*29 -7wave of "trash" is unstoppable - eg. Leavis « Thomson and others J ,
30or that "'things are no wrose than they always have been" etc.
.e na-
All of Adorno's available writings on music are to be seen in the 
context of these concerns - even his "Philosophy of Modern Music" whose 
ostensible object is the work of Schoenberg and Stravinsky. But a num­
ber of works are of particular* importance here, since they discuss pop­
ular music as well as "serious", and "modes of listening" as well as com­
position and "'distribution". (The occurrence of terms from political 
economy (production, distribution, consumption, industry) from here on 
is the unavoidable consequence of entering arguments about contemporary 
music, in which an "industrial" structure is relevant at every point).
Here I will present a sort of synthetic account of Adorno's funda­
mental view of musical practices in general, and popular music in par­
ticular, constructed from all these works; and a few preliminary cri­
ticisms which point forward to the alternative view I will be presenting 
elsewhere. Music, says Adorno, has "immanent laws". This essential 
point has been misunderstood by some of his critics ;and so requires 
further elucidation before his approach to contemporary musical practices 
can be explained, Adorno does not seek the sanction of acoustic physics 
for a particular type of music as some writers have done. On the 
contrary he writes:
"The idea that the tonal system is exclusively of natural.
origin is an illusion rooted in history. This "Second
nature" owes the dignity of its closed and exclusive system
32to merchantile society.,...."
We may assume that if Adorno holds this to he true of European tonal 
music (which he has been accused of favouring unduly) then he holds 
it to be true of other types of music too. If there is ethnocentr- 
city in his theory on this score it is of the nature of a (revealing) 
lacuna, and not a damning of refutation of the whole.
If the "laws” of music are not "natural” but social in origin, 
we must ask in what precise ways they are seen as originating, opera­
ting and changing. Discussing the idea of the "materials" at the 
disposal of the "composer", Adorno writes:
"'This material is traditionally defined - in terms of 
physics or possibly in terms of the psychology of sound - 
as the s\Mi of all sounds at the disposal of the composer.
The actual compositional material however, is as different 
from this sum as is language from its total supply of 
sounds. It is not simply a matter of the increase and 
decrease of this supply in the course of history. All its 
specific characteristics are indications of the historical 
process..... The "Material" itself is a. crystallisation of
the creative impulse,an element socially predertermined 
through the consciousness of man...... / ThusJ/ all the
tonal combinations employed in the past by no means stand 
indiscriminately at the disposal of the composer today.
Even the more insensitive ear detects the shabbiness and 
exhaustion of the diminished seventh coord and certain chro­
matic modulatory tones in the adieu music of the 19th century.
For the technically trained ear, such vague discomfort is
33transformed into a prohibitive canon..... etc."
This comparison with language has its dangers, but it helps, I 
thinks to explain why Adorno felt able to distinguish "lawful" from "un­
lawful" musical developments. Change in "musical material" proceeds 
within socio-historically-created directions and limits, and not in an 
ideally-free way as might otherwise be thought. Because this "materiel" 
is "of the same origin as the social process" it is not wholly malleable, 
capable of infinite transformation at any given time, but has a certain 
meaningfulness, which functions as a "given" to which new musical work
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must relate if it in turn is to have meaning. / Such development, by 
the way, can be progressive or regressive, according to Adorno. This 
point, which seems to rest on an un-mentioned analogy with natural evo-
ness and direction, as explained above) is located not in composers'
minds, not in the score, still less in abstract "imagination" or "spirit",
(although these categories do have a pls.ce in Adorno's theory), nor is
it simply a pressure from the listeners. Its locus is the changing
relationship, dialectically conceived, between musicians and listeners.
Both parties are more or less active, and more or less conscious, in
their effect on each other and on the development of the "musical
material" itself. V/ishart has claimed that Adorno makes no "attempt to
3i+uncover the social bases of aesthetic response styles" but in fact, 
Adorno's theory accords listeners an active, transforming role in musical 
development, and furthermore, in "Introduction to the Sociology of Music" 
he suggests precisely a typology of contemporary listening for empirical 
verification. This particular line of criticism of Adorno is clearly 
unjustified. For instance, statements such as:
are clear evidence of a more complex and subtle view of the ultimate 
social derivation of the "laws" of musical material, as well as its 
relative autonomy at a given time, than V/ishart can apparently compre­
hend.
Adorno's remarks about the "shabbiness and exhaustion"’ of certain 
elements of 19th century "salon music ■ show us how he conceives of this 
kind of musical development taking place. Certain conventions become 
hackneyed, to listeners as well as to musicians, and fire dropped while
lution, is of great importance at a later stage in the
The "historical tendency" which exists in music (i.e. its limited­
"sacrosanct traditional music has come to resemble commercial
mass production in the character of its performances and in
its role in the life of the listener, and its substance has
35noi. escaped this influence"
and
"social reception is not one with musical content not even 
with the social one for which the musical one serves as a
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new ones become accep ed. The innovating composer or performer may 
rupture the understanding with the listeners but it is soon re-established 
as the innovation is appreciated as logical and necessary by them.. Such 
development justifies the epithet "autonomous art", according to Adorno. 
However, the social conditions required for the flourishing of this 
particular kind of "autonomy" are only temporarily and insecurely (or 
'‘contradictorily"^ present in European history, namely during the rise
and heyday of the bourgeoisie. Already in this period the social ten­
dencies which will undermine it are at work - namely the invasion of 
the "cultural sphere" by commodity-production and its concomitant 
psycho-social phenomenon, fetishism.
Mozart's career and Haydn's move from ecclesiastical and aristo­
cratic patronage, respectively, to a bourgeois position of composing 
and mounting performances of, their works directly for a paying audience. 
Already before them Handel and otheis had done this in the most advanced 
mercantile nation, England, while after them it increasingly became the 
norm. Nonetheless it was a precarious bourgeoisdom for most, and only a 
century after Beethoven's career of shocking nobility and royalty with 
his radical espousal of the "bourgeois freedoms'', the composers of the 
"second Vienna school” - Schoenberg, Berg, Webern - found themselves 
unable to organise profitable concerts during the post-world weir one 
inflation, and began to experience the full force of that isolation and 
incomprehension which has, in this century, once again forced many "serious" 
composers into seeking and accepting patronage - this time, that of 
Governments and "foundations" funded out of corporation profits. Thus 
the very "mode of production" which began by liberating composers and 
performers from a patron's whim ends by "proletarianising" them and 
subjecting their production to that alienation from its social destina­
tion and "usefulness" which destroys in reality the ideal freedoms of all 
wage and salary earners. On the subject of modern patronage Adorno writes:
"The conflict between commission and autonomy results in a reluc­
tant and scanty production...... / and, he concludes, there may be_J7
..... validity in the suspicion..., that the condept of great music
which has today been passed on to radical music / meaning Schoenberg 
and a few others - DB / belongs itself only to a moment in history...
Once music has been refined to an end in itself, its purposelessness,
or a pragmatic concern with the consumer market, causes it to atrophy."'37
At the same time as commodity production has derailed the “autonomy" 
of serious music from the side of production, commodity-fetishism has 
invaded the manner in which listening is done, destroying the "mode of 
listening" which supported the "serious tradition" of the 18th and. 19th 
centuries, while developing another mode in an audience vastly larger - 
namely, "the masses". This development is the subject matter of one of 
Adorno's most important essays "on the Fetish-character in husic and the 
Regression of Listening.""'
In order to explain precisely and in detail what effects commodity- 
character and fetishism have on musical production and listening, in 
Adorno's view, I will use a string of quotes from this essay with some 
added explanation. I have not quoted them in their order of appearance 
in the essay, however, but in an order which clarifies, I hope their 
logic at the expense of Adorno's literary presentation.
Serious music is performed in a manner which does violence to the 
intentions encoded in the works. Thus is some cases "classics" are 
performed in a way which Adorno, quoting Edward Steuermann calls "the 
barbarism of perfection":
"Perfect, immaculate performance in the latest style preserves 
the work at the price of its difinitive reification,"
/ Here Adorno is presumably thinking of "great recordings" /. Alternatively 
the works are sacrifieed to the "personality" of the particular conductor, who, 
"like a Fuhrer", "reduces" aura and organisation to a common denominator". 
Again, they may be performed, or even arranged anew - a practice which 
Adorno considers particularly pernicious - in such a way that
"the delight in the movement and the gay facade becomes an 
excuse for absolving the listener from the thoughtof the whole, 
whose claim is comprised in proper listening. The listener is 
converted, along his line of least resistance, into the acquie­
scent purchaser..... The isolated moments of enjoyment prove 
incompatible with the immanent constitution of the work of art, 
and whatever in the work goes beyond them to an essential per­
ception is sacrificed to them. They are not bad in themselves 
but in their diversionary function."
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This emphasis on climaxes, big tunes, unusual orchestrations, etc 
in the performance or up-dating of the ‘’classics11 corresponds, says 
Adorno, to the new mode of listening which has become predominant in 
Europe and the U.S. this century. And because of this same listening- 
pattern, new music is composed which lays claim to the serious tradition 
but which actually panders to the new type of listeners. Tchaikowksy 
is the originator of this trend says Adorno, which has continued via 
Rachmaninov Sibelius and others. Increasingly however, ’’banal ’ and 
unashamedly "light” types of music have come to predominate, and so 
what we know as contemporary "popular music” is arrived at.
On this subject, and its relation to serious music, Adorno writes:
"The power of the street ballad, the catchy tune, and all the 
swarming forms of the banal has made itself felt since the 
beginning of the bourgeois era. Formerly it attacked the 
cultural privilege of the ruling class. But today, v/hen that 
power of the banal extends over the entire society, its 
function has changed....... The diverse spheres of music must
be thought of together. Their static separation, which certain 
caretakers of culture have ardently sought..... the neat
parcelling out of music's social fields of force,is illusionary 
...... It would be just as easy to go in the other direction,
and conceal the break between the two spheres, assuming a con- 
tinum which permits a progressive education leading safely 
from commercial jazz and hit songs to cultural commodities.
'/ By "cultural" here (not always) Adorno simply means serious 
or classical works /." This unity of the two spheres of music 
is that of an unresolved contradiction..... (elsewhere he adds)
....  The illusion of a social preferece for light music as
against serious is based on that passivity of the masses which 
makes . . the consumption of light music
contradict the objective interests of those who consume it. It 
is claimed they actually like light music and listen to the higher 
type only for reasons of social prestige, when acquaintance with 
■ the text of a single hit-song suffices to reveal the sole function 
this object of honest approbation can perform."
/
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With statements like the last, Adorno is on his weakest ground.
He does not merely generalise, he admits of no exceptions. And this 
sort of bluff overstatement is found again and again in his writings. 
When he does get round to considering possible exceptions he sees 
them as unrealised possibilities (eg the potential in jazz, which 
Adorno sees but considers to be thwarted by market conditions) o r as 
dying remnants (eg. the occasional felicitous musical phrases and 
progressions whose very beauty merely underlines the banality of the 
whole). He is weak, however on examples, and also sometimes falls into 
the common error of discussing principally lyrics ("text”) when arguing 
about the supposed bad effect on listeners' consciousness, despite the 
emphasis on the music in the argument as a whole.
This endless supply of trivialised, lifeless and destructured per­
formances of classics, of new "serious" music written with the appeal of 
frequent climaxes, "collossalism", "big tunes" etc in mind, and of light 
and popular music which is no longer ashamed of its "non-autonomous" 
state, of its thoroughgoing commodity - status - this supply is hoth a 
response to, and a contributory cause of, the development of the new 
"fetishistic" mode of listening, which in turn is part of the develop­
ment of "mass-culture" as a whole. A socio-economic development ("culture- 
industry") and a socio-psychological one underlie this chance, says Adorno, 
and here he implicitly or explicitly always refers to the other works of 
the "Frankfurt School" on these questions.
The socio-economic development involved is a strong economic con­
centration, and sharpening competition, among the corporations, which 
Adorno derives in a relatively "orthodox" Marxist manner from the "ten­
dency of the rate of jorofit to fall," allied with the penetration by 
these competing corporations of new markets - in the working masses 
themselves - on an ever-larger scale. The "petty" character of the 
itfhole business of cultural commodities in the 18th and 19th centuries 
has given way to an industrialisation of distribution and marketing; 
and the continued artizanic character of musical production (song­
writing and economically-autonomous musicians and bands contracting 
themselves to corporations etc) has become anachronistic. "Song- 
factories" and mass-production have not been able to take over this
production however in the main, because, Adorno argues, the illusion
, nessof individuality and personal- m  ohe pop-song is necessary for it to
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pell. It is an illusion, however, because, although the individual or 
small-group-pattern of production survives the imperatives imposed by 
mass-distribution,and the economics of the process force the producers 
into the repetition os successful formulae', the eschewment of too much 
experiment, the writing of banal lyrics and so on.
The socio-psychological development in question is more complex.
The masses are atomised, they have no existence ”for-themselves” due 
to the inadequacy of their unions and political parties, and are thus 
subject to the domination not only of a ruling class economically- 
speaking but of its ’’ideology*1 in all its forms. This ideology has 
had severed, phases, and has moved, in modern times, into a phase which 
rests heavily on the direct mystifying power of the commodity-forni.
This is allied to vast proliferation of sonsumer-goods, technificationP
of all aspects of their production and consumption, and a related recom­
position of the working classes both in terms of the greater numbers 
doing light-industrial and white-collar work and in terms of their 
standards of life. Precisely, the process means that the masses see 
their liberation, their future improvements and their present satis­
factions in terms which each point to Commodity which is there for 
them to buy and use. The curtailment of their use of productive and 
creative powers outside of wage-work proceeds till it is total, or 
alternatively till the only uses made of such,powers are themselves 
means for ensnaring people into further consumption - as in do-it-yourself, 
gardening, or ’’home-music -making”. No ’’escape-attempts” remain which 
are not really deceptions of this kind, says Adorno.
Thus in their listening, the masses have ’’regressed”, not in relation 
to the masses of the past but in the precise sense that a minority-mode 
of listening existed previously which was concentrated, knowledgeable 
and. interested in the structure of the whole, and this mode now has no 
heirs, except a few remaining individuals. The new listening is not 
conscious in the same sense as the old, though it incorporates ’’sudden 
d-ives into recognition'-1, which merely confirm the familiarity of a tune 
often heardbut not normally consciously perceived.
’’They ^  the ’’listening subjects” 7 listen atomistically, and 
dissociate what they hear”. ’’Deconcentration is the perceptual 
activity which prepares the way for the forgetting and sudden
recognition of mass music. If the standardised products, 
hopelessly like one another except for conspicuous bits 
such as hit lines, do not permit concentrated listening 
without becoming unbearable to the listeners, the latter 
are in any case no longer capable of concentrated listening 
..... Benjamin’s reference to the apperception of the 
cinema in a condition of distraction is just as valid for 
light music. The usual commercial jazz can only carry out 
its function because it is not attended to during conversa­
tion, and above all as an accompaniment to dancing.”
This listening responds only to "striking melodic intervals, un- 
seti lint;modulations, intentional or unintentional mistakes, or whatever 
condenses itself into a formula by an especially intimate merging of 
melody and text". The listener does not, and indeed cannot, perceive 
"the v/hole" or the longer-term qualities of "form" which are so central 
to Western serious music, and so in the new popular music, listeners "are 
not even offered the structure which they cannot follow". On the other 
hand the "isolated charms" (which include, alongside the "unsettting 
modulations" etc mentioned above, tricks of execution and instrumental 
colouring) are of the most limited kind.
"They all centre on an impressionistically-softened tonality.
It cannot be said that interest in the isolated "colour" or 
the isolated sonority awakens a taste for new colours and 
new sonorities. Rather the atomistic listeners are the first 
to denounce such sonorities as "intellectual" or absolutely. 
every extravagant sonority must be so produced that the 
listener can recognise it as a substitute for a "normal" 
one. While he rejoices in the mistreatment the dissonance 
gives to the consonance whose plase it takes, the virtual 
consonance simultaneously guarantees that one remains within 
the circle."
Adorno spends little time in the "regression" essay explaining the 
socio-economic basis of this deconcentrated listening, and little time 
on the problems of psychological theory which his generalisations raise. 
Nonetheless we can construct his view of these questions from sections of 
this essay in conjunction with points he makes elsewhere. He writes:
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"The concept of musical fetishism cannot be psychologically
derived....  all contemporary musical life is dominated by
the commodity form....  music, with all the attributes of
the etherehland sublime which are generously accorded it, 
serves in America today as an advertisement for commodi­
ties which one must acquire in order to be able to hear 
music. If the advertising function is carefully dimmed in 
the case of serious music, it always breaks through in the 
case of light music. /~Adorno here seems to be thinking of 
radio, which combines the function of providing music with 
that of encouraging listeners to buy the records played^/.
The whole jazz business, with its free distribution of 
scores to bands has abandoned the idea that actual per­
formance promotes the sale of piano scores and phonograph 
records.5’ / ?? - is this a mistranslation? Surely the 
point is that performances do serve as adverts for the scores 
and records, and this is why the publishers and record companies 
distribute their scores free to well-known bands. Perhaps 
"abandoned" should read "adopted" or "promotes" should read 
"prevents"? 7
"Countless hit songs5texts praise the hitsongs themselves, 
repeating their titles in capital letters. What makes its 
appearance like an idol out of such masses of type is the 
exchange-value in which the quantum of possible enjoyment 
has disappeared. Marx defines the fetish character of the 
commodity as the veneration of the thing made by oneself, 
which as exchange-value simultaneously alienates itself from 
producer to consumer - "human beings51. / ? ~ J "A commodity is 
therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social 
Character of mens' labour appears to them as an objective 
chracter stamped upon the product of that labour". This 
is the real secret of success. It is the mere reflection of 
what one pays in the market for the product. The consumer 
is really worshipping the money that he himself has paid for 
the ticket to the Tascanini concert. He has literally "made" 
the success which he reifies and accepts as an objective 
criterion, without recognising himself in it. But he has
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not '’made1' it by liking the concert but rather by buying the 
ticket. To be sure exchange-value exerts its power in a 
special way in the realm of cultural goods. For in the world 
of commodities this realm appears to be exempted from the 
power of exchange, to be in an immediate relationship with the 
goods, and it is this appearance, in turn, which alone gives
cultural goods their exchange value....  The appearance of
immediacy is as strong as the compulsion of exchange-value is 
inevitable. The social compact harmonises the contradiction. 
The appearance of immediacy takes possession of the mediated 
exchange-value itself. If the commodity in general combines 
exchange-value and use-value, then the pure use-value, whose 
illusion the cultural goods must preserve in completely capi­
talist society, must be replaced by pure exchange-value, which, 
precisely in its capacity as exchange-value deceptively takes 
over the function of use-value. The specific fetish-character 
of music lies in this quid pro quo. The feelings which go to 
the exchange-value create the appearance of immediacy at the 
s_ame time as the absence of a relation to the object belies it. 
It has its basis in the abstract character of exchange-value. 
Every ’’psychological” aspect, every ersatz satisfaction, de­
pends on such social substitution.”"^ f  My emphasis throughout 
this quotation^/7.
This highly problematic passage is central to the whole of Adorno's 
theory of contemporary musical practices. It is cryptic and contorted in 
■style, as well as loose in grammar, though the translator may be partially 
responsible here. I have underlined points v/hich seem to me to be difficult 
but important throughout. Firstly he asserts that the ’’quantum of possible 
enjoyment” disappears into pure exchange-value. This might seem to be a 
clumsily-ekpressed reference to that point of Capital, Chapter 1 , in v/hich 
Marx writes that for the purposes of exchange, the use-value of a commodity 
is irrelevant and only its exchange-value matters. But Adorno then writes 
that the thing a person makes ’’alienates itself from producer to consumer - 
"human beings.”" Apart from the problems raised by his use of the term 
"alienation" here, there is the peculiar addendum, "human beings" at the 
end of the sentence. These terms are not from the chapter on commodities 
in Capital, but brought together from other writings of Marx. For what
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reason?, we may ask. This becomes a little clearer a few lines further 
on, when Adorno argues that the consumer makes the success of a concert 
by buying the ticket, but does so "without recognising himself in it". 
The consumer is now the producer of the musical success, and experiences 
the same estrangement from this product that the alienated labourer does 
from the thing ''he1! makes. Now Marx does posit the unity of production 
and consumption as moments of the economic process, but it must be 
questioned whether he posits it in this form, either in "capital" or in 
the section on this question in the "Grundrisse". He posits production 
as a social process, distribution as determining "the proportion in 
which the individual shares in the product", and exchanges as delivering 
"the particular products into which the individual desire s to convert 
the portion which distribution has assigned to him". Consumption is 
then seen as "gratification" / of "needs" / or "individual appropria­
tion".
"In consumption, the product steps outside this social 
movement and becomes a direct object and servant of indi­
vidual need, and satisfies it in being consumed".
There is no question of use-value "vanishing" here - it has its irre­
ducible moment, that of satisfying a. "need". He goes so far as to say 
that consumption
"actually belongs outside economics except insofar as it 
reacts in turn upon the point of departure, and initiates 
the whole process anew"J*0
However Marx does not leave the matter here. He continues: 
"Production is also immediately consumption" - and "Consumption is also 
immediately production". So, for instance, production consumes "raw 
materials", while the consumption of food for example, produces the 
consumer's body. Marx writes: "every kind of consumption.... in one 
way or another produces human beings in some particular aspect." And 
below continues:
"Consumption produces production in a double v/ay, (1) because 
a product becomes a real product only by being consumed......
(2) because consumption creates the need for new production, 
that is it creates the ideal, internally compelling cause for
/production, which is its pre-supposition. Consumption
creates the motive for production; it also creates the
object which is active in production as its determinant
aim..... No production without a need. But consumption
if jreproduces the need.”
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Marx goes on for several pages making his abstract categories more and 
more precise. But it is already clear that a bland identity between 
consumption as an activity and the labour-process, such as Adorno 
suggests, is not his point. It may be true that the consumer co-pro- 
duces a ipusical event in a very particular sense, but this should not 
be confounded with the general (abstract) unity of production and 
consumption, nor should this general unity be mistaken for an identity. 
(Marx adds "Noting simpler for a Hegelian than to posit production and 
consumption as identical”!). Here at the heart of Adorno's "Marxism”
I think we can being to trace his error, his principal misunderstanding 
which begins to derail the whole train of his theoretical thought. He 
believes that the consumer, "making” the success but failing to "recog­
nise himself in it”, is alienated in the same primary sense as the 
labourer in relation to the product. In arguing this he not only 
collapses the specificity of consumption but also misrepresents the 
relationship between the "individual” and the "social” in Marx's argu­
ment, for it is not for the individual consumer to recognise himself in 
another individual's product anyway, but to recognise the socially- 
imprinted character and meaning of the product (insofar as he and its 
producer share, in their humanity and historical placement, attributes 
(of "subjectivity”), v/hich enables communication, or in this case, let 
us still say consumption, to take place), and so to find in it the satis­
faction of "need".
Of course in this introductory section of. the "Grundrisse" Marx is 
arguing at a "high level" of abstraction about the categories "production" 
"Consumption" etc in general. It is still conceivable that Adorno, despite 
sloppily miscontruing "Capital" has a valid point. That is, it may be 
that the consumption of cultural goods in the present phase of capitalism 
does "alienate" the consumer. Or, perhaps to the extent that consumers 
co-produce cultural goods in a special sense, (ie. produce cultural "meanings”) 
they share the alienation of the producers in a more immediate v/ay than in
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consuming '’ordinary'' products. Adorno is by no means clear here^at 
first he seems to consider “fetishism" in general as more or less 
identical with the primary alienation of the producer under capitalism 
as a misrecognition of commodities which, though originating in the
production-process, has become the psycho-social concomitant of the 
complete permeation of society by commodities, and as such universal. 
/~If so, he does indeed collapse the specificity of consumption com­
pletely; if not, he is guilty merely of momentarily oversimplifying^. 
Later he argues more specifically about the particular fetishism of 
music, in a way which suggests that despite the error, in his inter­
pretation of Marx (an error I find by reading "Grundrisse", but which 
Adorno in 19*K) made without access to that text) the second half, 
roughly speaking, of the long quotation above is precisely an attempt 
to formulate a more consistent and acceptable thesis. Cultural goods, 
argues Adorno, are a special case, because the "appearance of immediacy" 
is what enables them to sell. They preserve the illusion of a "pure 
use-value" of something untouched by the market, something "higher" more 
"human" and more spiritualised than the banal relations of everyday 
life. He grants here that "the commodity in general combines exchange- 
value and use value", (without mention of "vanishing"), and goes on to 
argue that it is the particular character of "cultural goods" which 
forces them to turn eventually into pure exchange-value (posing as 
use-value), rather than a "vanishing" of use-value inherent in every 
commodity. He is not very clear, however, on the subject of what this 
particular character consists of.
The difficulty here centres around the word "immediate" which Adorno 
appears to use in a strict sense, as the opposite of "mediated". If all 
commodities are objectified human labour, then consumption is an indirect 
social relationship with a producer. Furthermore the consumer can only 
consume by having money, which is his or her payment for producing some­
thing else, generally speaking. The exchange equates these two different 
kinds of labour as quantities of "abstract" human labour. This is what 
Adorno means by'the abstract character of exchange-value". Thus exchange 
is a "mediated" social relation. The two parties are each present in it, 
but the thing exchanged seems, to each of them, to be a third wholly separate 
component - a "commodity". The possibility of an "immediate" relation is 
camouflaged by the commodity-form. The "cultural goods" appear as exceptions
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to this pattern because they seem to contain the ideas, feelings and 
values, of the producer in such a way that these are directly available 
to the consumer. Something human, not "reified", appears to be on 
sale.
In his attempt to relate this persuasive view of the specificity 
of cultural goods to his earlier misconstruction of Marx, Adorno then 
comes up with the final complex formulations I have underlined.
"The feelings which go to the exchange-value create the 
appearance of immediacy at the same time as the absence of 
a relation to the object belies it".
Having denied the specificity of consumption as a satisfaction of needs, 
Adorno now sees no "relation to the object" at all in consumption, and 
presumes that the exchange-value is doubling-up as a use-value, as it 
were, that it is posing as an "immediacy"' which it is not. In other 
words, the consumer's are purchasing a pure exchange-value under the 
illusion that it will satisfy their "need" for "culture".
Clearly this formulation will no do. However, in the same sense 
that his view of the specificity of cultural goods redeemed part of his 
argument from its error of misconstruing Marx, so the same insight seems 
to me to be rescuable here. We can tear free the conception which says 
consumers purchase the "illusion’' of immediacy from the context of specu­
lation about exchange-value, and reformulate it more or less as follows: 
Consumers are placed in the position of having to purchase a thing in 
order to hopefully, satisfy the "cultural" need. This opens up the 
abstract possibility of things being offered which cannot.satisfy this 
need, since the consumer only finds this out later. This in turn can 
be disguised by various discourses about "art" etc, which, whatever 
their "truth-content" as ideology, here function to make the consumer 
confused about his or her reactions, to reconstruct those reactions along 
lines which acquiesce to the "sub-standard" things on offer, and to whet 
the appetite of the consumer for more, and always hopefully, better accesses 
of "cultural" satisfaction in future. Something like this circle of 
"regression" is indeed implied throughout Adorno's musical writings. I
I mentioned above that both the socio-economic and the psychological 
implications of Adorno's "Regression" thesis were not spelt out fully in
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the essay, and, having dealt' with the economic somewhat cursorily X 
.will now attempt to cover the suggestions of a social-psychological order 
which arise. Firstly however, I must make a comment on ’'needs’1. The 
way I have quoted from Marx above, and the way I have used the term 
myself, might seem to imply that I see needs as simple, more or less 
fixed, perhaps biologically-derived, conditions of ’’being human1’.
Food, shelter and rest, perhaps sex and perhaps ’'spiritual” yearnings 
of a less tangible kind, v/ould seem to constitute quite an unobjection­
able list. Nothing could be further from my intention. Roughly speaking 
I am with Adorno in conceptualising ’’needs” as being always the concrete, 
historically-placed needs of individuals and groups, and the apparent 
continuities across epochs o'f such needs as food and shelter are then 
seen as too abstract to be analytically useful; we must conceive of the 
reproduction of needs in continuously modified forms, as part of the 
process of history, specifically as an aspect of the ’’humanisation" of 
the "natural" which is rooted finally in labour. The body and mind of 
the labourer, no less than the materials worked on, are progressively 
transformed, and all their attribates reproduced in changed forms as labour 
proceeds. When Marx calls "human nature" a "totality of needs and drives” 
(Grundrisse) he is not positing a static totality, as numerous passages 
of the book demonstrate. Nonetheless the "need" does impose itself on 
the concrete individual as "given", as a more or less "natural" thing, and 
enters through the individual into the economic and social process as a 
necessity - i.e. the "reproduction of labour-power". The process itself 
however changes and reproduces the needs it satisfies and thus produces 
future necessities which to the present individual cannot seem necessary. 
The "historical and moral" factor involved in the social definition of 
subsistence, which Marx points to in Capital, is an alternative formula­
tion of the same insight. ■ ■
However the nature of the "need" which, according to Adorno, induces 
consumers to buy things repeatedly which nonetheless do' not satisfy the 
need, (though they may increase the craving?) is clearly problematical 
in a particular way. Either Adorno is arguing that a real need for 
"things cultural", an “aesthetic" need, perhaps, exists in everyone in 
our time, but is not capable of satisfaction through cultural commodities 
because their commodity-status has destroyed their cultural meaning; 
or he is saying that a "false need" for these commodities, despite their
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objective "untruth”, has arisen and poses as the true need for culture 
which is either buried irretrievably beneath it or extinguished in some 
way. If we read the "Regression” essay carefully, and also Adorno’s 
"Philosophy of New Music" and "Introduction to the Sociology of Music" 
we begin to discover that Adorno says both these things, or vacillates 
between them.
Nowhere in Adorno, to my knowledge, is the theory of "false needs"
explicitly set out. But to the extent that it seems to underlie some
of his descriptions of "listening" - viz especially "Introduction to
the Sociology of Music" - I have considered it worthwhile to glance at
his collegue Marcuse’s version of this theory in the brief form in which
A2it is presented in "One-Dimensional Man".
Having stated that "human needs are historical needs"', in the sense 
given above, Marcuse writes:
"We may distinguish both true and false needs. "False"' are 
those which are superimposed upon the individual by particu­
lar social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetu­
ate toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice. Their satis­
faction may be most gratifying to the individual, but this 
happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and 
protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability 
(his own and others) to recognise the disease of the whole and 
to grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then 
is euphoria in unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to 
relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with 
the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, 
belong to this category of false needs....... "Truth" arid
"falsehood" of needs designate objective conditions to the 
extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital, needs, and, 
beyond it the progressive alleviation of toil and poverty, are 
universally valid standards. But as historical standards they 
do not only vary according to area and stage of development, 
they can also be difined only in (greater or lesser) contradic­
tion to the prevailing ones" (his emphasis).
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Marcuse, then, justifies his theory of ’’false needs” finally by an 
appeal to a relativistic Utopia. While recognising the historical charac­
ter of standards of ’’satisfaction of vital needs, and..... progressive 
alleviation of toil and poverty^/ he argues that, nonetheless, we should 
counterpose our definitions of these to the contemporary reality as 
critical weapons. The problem is now one of ’’original sin” -
"how can the people who have been the object of effective and 
productive domination by themselves create the conditions of 
freedom?”
The problem here is that Marcuse has done away with the belief of Marx 
that the conditions of proletarianisation, in combination with crises 
of the economic system, can produce an awareness of the surpassability 
of the present, and of its desirability, and has replaced it with a 
definitive claim that, on the contrary, the very logic of capitalist 
development has produced the ’’total administration” of the ’’population” 
as a whole, so that the individuals who might fight are ’’kept incapable 
of being autonomous..... indoctrinated and manipulated down to their 
very insticts”.
But Marcuse's logic is not so impeccable as first reading might 
suggest. At the very beginning he posits an ’’individual” who suffers 
the ’’imposition” of needs, and who therefore is already a formed social 
subject prior to this contamination, presumably. Clearly no such 
process takes place in ’’advanced capitalist” society, since the indi­
vidual is formed by a socialisation already possessing the basic 
character which the individual is to help ’’reproduce”. Thus at this 
level there can be no talk of falsehood and truth but only of change and 
identity. Marcuse imports the categories ”true"and ’’false” from his 
view of ’’vital needs and.... alleviation of toil etc”, and superimposes 
them on his model of socialisation. To cover his tracks he then solemnly 
assures the reader that these categories truth and falsehood are "historical.” 
and not definable except by contradicting what exists. While this is true 
in itself, Marcuse is simply using it to disguise the fact that he wants 
to judge ’’needs” by reference to a moral schema, rather than judging 
that scheme by reference to needs. Now certainly the moment of criticising 
"reality” must always make reference to ideal categories including "moral” 
ones, but when these categories of critical thought are turned into the
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court of appeal by which the ‘‘truth’1 or “falsehood11 of real “needs'1 is 
to be judged, then either Marcuse has slipped into an ethical idealism 
or he is dangerously misusing the terms “true11 and “false" to mean 
simply "more or less autonomous to the individual" and "more or less 
heteronomous to the individual" respectively.
To return to Adorno, we can see clearly that his theory would 
tend to place contemporary listening alongside relaxing and having 
fun in Marcuse’s list of "false needs". And as I have remarked, there 
is some justification for seeing Adorno’s view as similar to Marcuse’s 
on this point, and open to the same criticisms. Certainly the following 
formulations from "Introduction" are within something like the same 
problematic:
"tired businessmen.... who seek in a realm that will not 
affect their lives, to compensate for what they must deny 
themselves otherwise;11 - the "emotional listener11, who 
"considers music a means to ends pertaining to the economy 
of his own drives"; - music to the"vast majority" of listeners 
is"not a meaningful context at all but a source of stimuli."
These quotations neatly move us on from the discussion of needs 
as a category effective in political economy to the subject of socio­
psychology , - namely the part of Adorno's approach which rests on an 
appropriation of Freud and others, and in which he tries to offer a 
set of suggestions about the psychological states and tendencies of the 
masses, as illuminated by their cultural consumption. If "needs11 a-id 
"drives" are conditioned, social, phenomena and not simply natural, 
biologically-given attributes, then the process of their internalisa­
tion, and the nature of changes and developments in this, become integral 
and important, problems of social-scientific inquiry. With this insight 
firmly in mind, Adorno returned again and again throughout his ■ career 
to the problems of bringing psychoanalysis and social psychology into 
the totalising framework of his personal brand of Marxism. The famous 
study "The Authoritarian Personality”, of which he was the co-author, 
is the locus classicus of these concerns, but I think it is possible to 
present a very simple outline of his view without taking on such a 
difficult and substantial text. 'That is written here is therefore based 
on the musical and other writings already referenced.
The development of capitalism, has passed through various phases, 
arricing in our time, in the "advanced countries" at a phase characterised 
by monopolies, proliferating state controls of economy and social life, 
and a "consumer revolution" in which the mass of the working class gains 
access to an unprecedented range of commodities but at the price of 
entering into a type of relation to them which is unfree - this last 
point being the fetishism/needs complex discussed above„ The bourgeois 
revolution and the industrial revolution swept away previous social 
relations and replaced them with a new type, characterised by a "free­
dom" extending to all male and some female persons, to enter autonomously 
the sphere of exchange, the market,, In practice those who only had 
labour-power to sell and those who had accumulations of wealth became 
two classes, bourgeois and proletarian, but the possibilities of self- 
help, the phenomenon of "self-made men" the virtue of thrift and temper­
ance etc, - these were for a time real conditions for many as v/ell as 
ideologies for deceiving the masses. Furthermore, and closely related 
to this freedom to "improve" the condition of the self, there was a 
mobilisation of all the bourgeos, petit boureois and proletarians who 
cared to take part, in a vast network of institutions, from clubs to 
professional associations to sports leagues etc. which spread itself 
across the class-reality of capitalist society, and both disguised it 
and was not without considerable "effectivity" within it, to use the 
presently-fashionable terminology. (This "civil society" (in one 
sense) had at first arisen in combat against the old social relations 
when the whole bourgeoisie and its allies involved themselves more or. 
less in struggles and controversies aimed at consolidating the new 
social relations and weakening the old). In the Britian and Germany 
of the middle 19th century, and in the U.S. also (but to a different 
extent and across a slightly later time-scale?) this network v/as at 
its height, and found its reflection in all the agencies of socialisa- 
tion. The family and the school combined to produce a highly-individua- 
listic, competent and outward-looking personality-type (typically the 
male "petit-bourgeois") and to a certain extent, to produce also the 
characteristics of this type elsewhere in the population. After this 
period, changes in these agencies,.(reflecting and helping to produce 
changes in social relations as a whole) produced a more submissive, even 
"masochistic" type adjusted to the control of. economic and state agencies, 
and again produced it not only in the "proletariat" but elsewhere too.
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The proletarianisation of various crafts and professions, and of much
intellectual labour hastened the spread of this development beyond the
barely-literate labourers of previous decades, although it also helped
to produce a sort of resentment of the process which Adorno professes—  ^
to see embodied in much listening-practice.
Precisely, the content of the change in socialisation is that the 
authority of the family (in which the strength of the two parental roles 
is mimicked and reinforced by the growing children as they internalise 
them) is weakened as schools and other institutions take over part or 
most of '' rearing children. This contributes to an atomisation from 
an early age, that is, to a weaker structure of reference and identity 
for children, so that, paradoxically, their individuality is weakened 
and not strengthened. This childhood prepares these less-than-indivi- 
duals for their atomised-working lives later, but is also reflected and 
reinforced in the patterns of their "leisure'1'. / Adorno is weak on 
specifying gender in these arguments, though certainly he has much to 
say about this and about male and female sexuality in other respects^/. 
Thus these atomised masses■know neither themselves nor the workings of 
their "world" which is increasingly controlled by a more or less fused, 
(but also non-self-conscious) technocracy - a combination of state and 
corporate bureaucracies; and they relate to themselves and their world 
through the mediation of commodities, all of which are conceived of as 
ministering to a need 'or drive of the self and nothing else, and there- 
foife as reinforcing the atomisation.
In "Introduction to the Sociology of Music", Adorno develops some 
of these suggestions in relation to a "typology of listening"'. He does 
not claim that there is any empirical basis for this typology, but 
derives it by logic and imagination from his general theory; and then 
suggests that it can be boiled down to a set of hypotheses and a 
methodology to form the starting point of an empirical study which would 
verify/modify the types. He does make some reference to his own radio­
research, and to various partial studies, -• eg. those of Macdougal, and
45Allport and Contrile, but it is clear that his devaluation of what is 
specific to consumption (above) influences his rather hasty, reductionist 
theorisations here.
He defines his first type as the "expert"- the "ideal type" of a
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completely adequate listener who practices a. '’structural1' approach, 
keeping past and future in his mind as he (sic) grasps each moment, 
including in his response an "affective element" but with the conscious 
mind always on top, "integr. t..ng" the whole process<> Hardly any such 
people exist, says Adorno, the typje is merely "the limit value of a 
typological series which extends away from it". It is clear already 
that this expert is an expert in European, serious music since it is 
in this music that the virtues of "structure" and extended "forms" are 
said by Adorno to find their highest expression. Also, this type is 
defined not psychologically but by competence.
The second type is the "musical person", and this type is defined 
also by competence, in the same sense, but it is not expected to have 
the same technical knowledge, or to use quite such fully-conscious 
mechanisms in listening. "Historically such musicality required a 
certain homogeneity of musical culture, furthermore it needed some 
solidity of the. total condition, at least in the group reacting to 
works of art". The old aristocracy, or some part of it, may have 
constituted such a group of such listeners. Hardly any bourgeois or 
petit-bourgeois individuals of this type occur any longer, and cer­
tainly none from other classes, except a few "polemical lone wolves 
who are already tending to expertise." (In this last category Adorno 
may be modestly counting himself). This type is therefore seen as 
supporting "autonomous music" in the past, but no longer existing in 
the same sense.
With the third, type Adorno arrives at real contemporary listening, 
and psychological explanation enters the argument. He describes the 
third type as the "sociological heir" to the second,
and calls it the "culture-consumer11. 
The culture consumer is a well-informed record collector and concert- 
goer, who "respects" music as a cultural asset, either from earnest 
sense of obligation or more or less out of snobbery. But the listening 
relationship is now to objects and techniques more than to the structure 
and meaning of music. "Interpretation" tuning, the age of instruments, 
and so on, occupy the attention. He (sic) "lies in wait for..... 
supposedly beautiful melodies, for grand I~orients". "The joy of 
consumption, of that which - in his language - music "gives" to him,
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outweighs his enjoyment of the music itself as a work of art that makes 
demands on him”. This is apparently a key group, forming the bulk of 
"serious” audiences, including the "coramittee-laclies" who wield so much 
power over American "Philharmonic” Orchestras. [  The idea of the work 
of art as definitively containing a meaning, and demanding that listeners 
attend to it is not, in Adorno, a contradiction in regard to his under­
standing that listeners co-produce musical meaning, but a particular 
claim he makes about !Iserious” or "classical” music, to the effect that 
it was written in a milieu (of "solidity” and "musicality") which accep­
ted and understood the code in use, and it could thus claim to objectify 
intended "meanings” in an accessible form, though of course this musical 
meaning is never verbalisable and never apprehended in a solely conscious 
intellectual manner^/. Though Adorno avoids discussion of ”fetishism” 
in this book, it is clearly in the background of such formulations as 
the ”joy of consumption” and "that which - in his language - music 
"gives” to him”.
With the fourth type, the "emotional listener”, this socio-psycho- 
logical kind of classification and explanation conies further to the fore. 
Music acts as a ”trigger” to listeners* feelings. Adorno speculates that 
this may often apply to people who can "invest their working lives with 
very little feeling”. The emotional listener, ostensibly naive, may in 
fact not want to know more about music: "Don't spoil it". Perhaps the
archetypal "tired businessmen” belong here, also those who respond to 
music with visual associations and those who fall into a vague "’torpor”. 
Music is, for the emotional listener, a "medium of pure projection”, and 
anything "immanent" in the music-heard except the "’trigger" itself is 
ignored.
The fifth type Adorno calls the "resentment listener". He is a 
"stark anti-type" to the fourth, -he "scorns the official musical life as 
washed out and phantasmic", and flees from it back into time, hoping to 
find an eld music "proof against reification" (unfortunately Adorno is 
unclear on where the category "reification" fits into his theory). The 
Bach fanatics and other "antiquarian”’ listeners fall into this category. 
They are often organised into societies, and have vast influence on 
musical education (in Germany). Their basic view is that all "Romantic" 
and modern music is self-indulgent, and that only old music permits an
access to "collectivity". They "self-deny", forbid themselves the can­
kered fruit of "'emotive music"', and indulge in sectarianism against other 
listeners. Adorno writes:
"the masochism of a mode of conduct where one must incessantly 
forbid oneself something or other indicates a necessary premise: 
collective coercion. Internalised, such coercion may v/ell remain 
a determinant of the type even where the listener's real situation 
is an isolated one. These listeners come from the upper petit- 
bourgeoisie faced with decline."
For decades members of this stratum have become more and more dependent, 
less and less able to turn into "outwardly self-determining"’ and thus 
"inwardley unfolding"•individuals. This has hampered their understanding 
of the "great music that is mediated..... by the individual .and his 
liberty". At the same time their fear of "proletarisation" (sic) made 
them cling to the ideologies of eminence, of elitism and of "inner values". 
Their consciousness in general, and their attitude towards music in par­
ticular, result then from this conflict between social position and ide­
ology. They pretend that this is no conflict and that they prefer the 
"collectivity" into which they are being pushed* And central to this 
pretence are such judgements or taste-preferences as their espousal of 
Baroque music (and in some cases modern "backward-looking" music such as 
that of Reger and Hinderraith) their professing to find in the "post-indi­
vidual" state the virtues of an idealised "pre-individual" state such as 
existed when Barogue music , ras written. The process is''formally comparable" 
to the fascist manipulation which ivested the
"compulsory collective of the atomised" with the insgima of a 
pre-capitalist, nature-grown "peoples community".
Adorno then goes on to argue that "jazz-1isteners*1 too are reacting 
against "official" musical culture in a similar way. But the jazz listener 
is free of the "ascetic-sacral gesture" he "boasts of his mimetic side even 
though he has reduced it to a pattern of standard devices". But jazz 
remains imprisoned within "expanded-irapressionistic" harmony and standardi­
sation of "form", as well as the 'undisputed predominance of the beat". And 
it is tied to commercial popular music by "its predominant basic material, 
the hit songs, if by nothing else". In this type, concludes Adorno on jazz 
listeners,
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■’the estrangement from sanctioned musical culture recoils 
into a preartistic barbarism vainly advertised as a burst 
of primal feelings”
This section is bold and sweeping in its scope and its method, and it 
seems to me that the ideas on antiquarian listening do have some value, 
and certainly deserve consideration, and perhaps some empirical verifi- 
catory work. But the section on jazz listeners is to say the least con­
fused, and appears to refer to the musicians not the listeners at the 
end. Also, in arguing that the basic material of "jazz” is hitsongs, 
Adorno reveals that he is thinking really of popular "big band” jazz 
or of ’’Dixieland” revivalism, perhaps and not of the whole jazz cer­
tainly.
Adorno’s sixth and last type is the ’’entertainment listener’1' 
("Unterhaltung” , his German term, has a derogatory cannotation not 
adequately expressed in the word "entertainment”). He believes these 
listeners are the vast majority, as well as being furthest from good 
("expert”) listening. The ground has been prepared in the "culture- 
consumer" and the "emotional listener* * o — o*-3 with these types, music to 
the entertainment listener, is "not a meaningful context but a source 
of stimuli”. With the sixth type nothing is left in listening except 
such stimuli. The extreme case of this is when music becomes a habit 
like smoking, with little or nc conscious attention given to it at all. 
People who cannot work without the radio on, people who seek to mnul 
loneliness or boredom by listening, all such listeners are "opposed 
to the effort which a work of art demands”. They make a virtue out of 
mediocrity, and listen "distractedly” with odd bursts of attention and
... bGrecognition.
After mentioning the possibility that there may be logically a 
seventh type - the un- or anti-musical person who does not like, does 
not "hear anything in” music at all - Adorno goes on to write a whole 
chapter on popular music which essentially expands the consideration of 
his sixth type, the "entertainment-listener". Here he writes:
"To people harnejL sed between their jobs and the reproduction 
of their working energies, the hits are purveyors of an ersatz 
for feelings which their contemporaneously revised egos tell
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them they should have. Socially the hits either channel 
emotions - thus recognising them - or vicariously fulfil 
the longing for emotions..... In an imaginary but psycho­
logically emotion - laden domain, the listener who reme­
mbers a hit song will turn into the song's ideal subject, 
into the person for whom the song ideally speaks. At the 
same time, as one of many who identify with that fictitious 
subject, that musical I, he will feel his isolation ease 
as he himself feels integrated into the community of f,fansi:. 
In whistling such a song he bows to a ritual of socialisa­
tion, although beyond this unarticulated subjective stirring 
of the moment his isolation continues unchanged.'
“Vulgarity", according to this section, is the crucial trait of 
popular music. “But I don't want to be human", the listeners say, in 
either a sullen or merry refusal to acknowledge “higher possibilities". 
It is this “identification with abasement", not the abasement-in-itself 
which is central, along with the fact that the abasement is administered 
and controlled. The standardisation of popular music cannot be under­
stood intra-musically, but only "sociolggically" (and psychologically) 
as aiming at "standard reactions", conditioned reflexes in the listener, 
and at their perpetual repetition. Those tonal sequences and simple 
rhyt’ims which are "sensed as problematic'1 by serious composers, and 
avoided as "hackneyed", turn up in popular music with "unproblematic 
imperiousness’: The tonal system as simplified and truncated in pop­
ular "tunes" is a "training course in a passivity that will probably 
spread to his thought and social conduct" / the listeners^/. Popular 
music, to be successful, must "void" a contradiction between catching the 
attention and at the same time remaining unobtrusively conventional in 
its "musical language". This requires a "pseudo-individualisation", as 
in the hopelessly-limited "improvisations" in commercial jazz, and it 
provides the basis for the survival of individual craftmanship in an 
otherwise rationalised industry. Likewise numerous individualising 
tricks of scoring of rehearsed spontaneity etc,are found throughout the 
performances and recordings of popular music.
In this framework of criticism, jazz seems to Adorno to have some 
unquestioned merits.
- k k  -
‘■Against the idiotic derivatives from the Johann Strauss-type 
operetta, it taught technique, presence of mind and the con­
centration which pop-music had discarded, and it developed 
the faculties of tonal, and rhythmical differentiation. The 
climate of jazz freed teenagers from the stuffily-sentimental 
utility music of their parents. Jazz calls for criticism only 
when a timeless fashion, organised and multiplied by special 
interests, comes to misconceive itself as modern, if not indeed 
as an avant-garde.
He quotes V/inthrop Sergeant as saying that ' jazz is a get-together art 
for regular follov/ers", and adds, that it is a. “sportive acoustical 
occasion for normal citizens to gather at". “'Jazz’', he continues, 
“stresses a conformist regularity by submerging the individual conscious 
ness in a kind of massive self-hypnosis". / it is not clear whether he 
is still quoting Jargeant here /. Later lie writes
"Certainly, jazz has the potential of a musical breakout from
this culture on the part of those who were either refused
admission to it or annoyed by its mendacity. Time and again
however, jazz became a captive of the culture-industry and
thus of musical and social conformism..... / But / .....
Popular music can :.io more be exploded from within,‘'■"“"its
lf7own sphere points beyond it."
Other points which can be seen as elements in a social-psychology 
of listening (which Adorno never systematically produced) are scattered 
through this book. For instance, he says "nostalgic songs" •' ' g “fake a 
longing for past, irrevocably lost experiences, dedicated to all those 
consumers who fancy that in memories of a fictitious past they will gain 
the life denied them." In the next chapter he writes that popular-music 
listeners
"do understand scraps of the context of meaning. The idiom 
of tonality, for instance, which circumscribes the traditional 
stock of music consumed today, is identical with the worldwide 
musical consumers' language. People may fail to grasp what is 
said in that language..... but they are familar with the works'
superficial connections..... 
current substitutes for the
Splashing along with the idiomatic 
performance of the thing itself(?)
and yet cannot be absolutely segregated."
- -
Music survives its degradation, and continues to be produced and con­
sumed, principally because "the reigning ideology keeps the failure to 
experience it from becoming conscious.
'“'In a society that has become functionalised virtually 
through and through, totally ruled by the exchange- 
principle, lack of function comes to be a secondary 
function. In the function of functionlessness truth 
and ideology entwine. Ivhat results from it is the 
autonomy of the work of art itself: in the context
of socieil effects, the man-made-in-itself of a work 
that will not sell out to that context promises some­
thing that would exist without defacement by the . 
universal profit. That somethin,' is nature".
Here Adorno restates, in altered form, his view of the transfer of 
"feelings to • exchange-value" from the earlier essay. He goes on 
to specify another aspect of this "fetishism" which surely is con­
siderably clearer and more useful than that early view;
"Accepting what there is has become the strongest glue of 
reality, the replacement of ideologies as specific, perhaps 
even as theoretically justifiabl y conceptions about what 
exists. The blindspot of unquestioning acceptance of a 
given thing, of something set in its place, is one of the 
invariants of bourgeois society. From Montesquieu on, that 
society lias honoured such given things with the title "his­
torically evolved."
This "positive" ideology which uses the existing to destroy the possible 
is indeed reinforced by every act of consumption which a person makes - 
insofar as one either contracts into this commodity - permeated society 
or dies.
Adorno goes on to discuss music's straight-forward distractive 
function, which he secs combining with the above affirmative one to 
constitute music's "ideological" character. Music is suited to these 
functions because it is a ‘conceptless language and hence, points to 
an abstract collectivity which is no less shared for being univerbalisable0
In responding to a piece of music people feel they are put in touch 
with “life51, with their own "human-ness", with their own "nature" and 
reminded that these things are "shared by all",
"Just as poor old women shed tears at a wedding of strangers, 
the consumed music is the eternal strangers" wedding for all".
Continuing his discussion of functions, Adorno suggests a "psychoana­
lytic" one, in which music becomes "a defence mechanism in the dynamic 
of drives".
"What it suggests to him (the listener), through the ritual, of 
being present and the identification with social power, as 
it paints his subjective course of time as meaningful, is 
this: that it is precisely in self-limitation, in entering 
into himself and departing from the hateful reality, that he 
will be in accord wit all, accepted by and reconciled with 
all.c.o. The deceptive moment, that lies in great music too, 
the autarky of an inwardness split off from objectivity and 
practice, and compensated in works of art by the truth content 
of their externalisation in a stretured objectivity - this 
moment, in functional music, is unreservedly transferred to 
ideology."
Thus if music seems to help people suffering from paranoia, it is by 
confirming them in "the Fata Morgana of inward abundance1' and this, 
though "'therapeutic" in no way does it enlarge or "cure"' them.
It is at the end of this discussion, of the "functions" of music, 
that Adorno turns his attention to the 'anthropological basis", as he 
calls it, of his socio-psychological hints and categories. He writes:
"The ear is passive. The eye is covered by a lid and must be 
opened; the ear is open, and must not so much turn its atten­
tion towards stimuli as seek protection from them. The acti­
vity of the ear, its attentiveness probably developed late, 
along with the strength of the ego; and universally regressive 
tendencies late ego traits will be the first to get lost. 
Deterioration of the faculty of musical synthesis, of the 
apperception of music as an aesthetic context of meaning, goes 
with relapsing into such passivity."
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The passive character of the ear cut it off from labour in any 
form, and it thus ended up a "tolerated enclave amid the rationalised 
world of labour. The fact that sounds are not things, in any sense, on 
which labour (as normally conceived) is performed, means that the ear 
remains undisturbed, and its function as a mental receiver remains
i|8conceptualised as a "deep interior'* of the mind.
The "Introduction1* like all of Adorno's musical writings is crammed 
with hypotheses and speculations, with theoretical polemics and concrete 
examples. I want to return here, however, to my criticisms of his basic- 
point of view, and to summarise them in a less meandering form than I 
have been able to present them insofar. Basically, I believe Adorno 
collapses the specificity of consumption as a "satisfaction of needs'*.
He considers the alienation of the producer and the fetishism (or rei­
fication) of the commodity by the consumer to be not merely linked but 
(via something called the "social compact" which unites consumers and 
producers) more or less identical. The misunderstanding of the whole 
social process which is supposed to result from these, is to Adorno 
the very foundation of all modern bourgeois ideology. In the case of 
cultural commodities the consumers relate not to the "work of art" but 
to the exchange-value it becomes in the market. Their fetishism renders 
them incapable of the immediate relationship with the work which consti­
tutes a proper appreciation, and they only go on buying such goods as a 
result ox the illusion (underpinned by ideological discourses about the 
"nature of art") that they embody something "human" something "really 
alive" in a context of dead and alienating commodities.
Of course Adorno is a knowledgeable Marxist, and the objections 
we can raise to this basic view on Marxist grounds are all mentioned in 
one place or another in his writings. Nonetheless the fact that he 
exhibits confusion in these arguments points back to the validity of 
my claim that the view summarised above is his basic one, and is erron- 
eous. So for instance he is aware of the category "needs'* but never 
completely engages it. And he is aware of the fact that his argument 
would do well to rest on a worked-out view of the specificity of cultural 
goods, and of the co-production of meanings which goes with them, yet still 
fcJLls back on generalities (in his accounts of alienation and fetishism) 
applying to all commodities.
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Adorno’s peculiar conception of “autonomous music" arises from his 
reduction of need-satisfaction to the purely economic category "’consump­
tion1' (!at least with reference to “mass-consumption in advanced capitalism), 
that is, from his ignoring of what is irreducibly extra-economic in con­
sumption, He readily grants the social character of musical meaning, and 
hence accords' listening a role in co-producing it, but he also argues 
that "'musical material" crystallises past social, “impulses" within an 
objective form which in a certain sense means those impulses, even 
though any given listener may not realise it. This view seems to me 
to rest on the existence of the score, and therefore to be true not of 
all music but of "European notated (and possibly recorded) music only.
The particular autonomy of that music then, can be precisely defined as 
follows: a coincidence of musical understanding between producers and 
listeners extending over a period of perhaps a century or two, exhibi­
ting steady internal change but even greater continuity, and enabling 
the idea of the “work" which wholly contains an intended meaning, to be 
realised repeatedly, more or lens, within the milieu in question, although 
even in this milieu some development of the work's meaning over the decades 
still remains inevitable.
Nov/ this wautonomy" is indeed a useful way of understanding the 
"classical" music in question. But because Adorno believes contemporary 
musical consumption to have "no relation to the object" consumed, to 
be entirely "fetishistic", he believes that no autonom3r whatsoever can 
be accorded to musical practices now. They are a peculiar enclave of 
the economic process not quite fully integrated into it structurally, but 
long ago emptied of their antagonistic content. That is, they are all 
epiphenomenal to the self-movement of capital.
But the capitalist "process" Adorno invokes here is a pure abstrac­
tion, a set of determinants -hich work through concrete social relations 
and "forces" but are not identical with them. The abstract process has 
become for Adorno the "real", while the concrete relations among human 
persons, (making, even when they do not comprehend it, their own history), 
have become abstract:- no real relation between producers and consumers 
of music is seen. This is not the purely "Hegelian" error often attri­
buted to Adorno, but a particular Hegelian relapse of Marxism, found no 
less in "Stalinist" reduction than in the apparent richness of the Frankfurt
- -
School. Sartre characterises it well in the following formulations: 
"The Marxist therefore is impelled to take as an appearance the real 
content of behaviour or of a thought; when he dissolves the particular 
in the universal, he has the satisfaction of believing; that he is re­
ducing appearance to truth* Actually by defining his subjective (his 
emph ) concept of reality, he has only defined himself;5' and "the de­
pendence of the worker who conies to sell his working strength cannot 
under any circumstance signify that this worker has fallen into an 
abstract existence. Quite the contrary, the reality of the market, no 
matter how inexorable its laws may be, and even in its concrete appea­
rance, rests on (my emphasis) the reality of alienated individuals
k q
and on their separation."
This error, then originates in Adorno’s misapprehension of the 
relationship of production and consumption, of producers" alienation 
and consumers’ "fetishism” , and there it rests on an idealist inversion 
of the abstract and the concrete, which though post-Marxist, is Hegelian 
in implications. It leads Adorno to confuse the particular relative 
autonomy he correctly identifies in European serious music with the 
general autonomy attributable to all musical, as to all social, prac­
tices, and hence to believe that once the former autonomy declines and 
disappears, lone at all is 3.eft* Contemporary listeners, whom he calls 
"post-individual” become in fact "post-human” , mere ciphers of a system 
which is now more ’real" thin they, and history, logically speaking 
stops. A13. Adorno’s brilliance, all his discrete insights, are rendered 
problematic by this error, and to be rescued require that we dig each 
of them carefully out of its bed. of ’’logical consequences” and set it 
on its feet, as a "socialigcal” insight to stand or fall in itself, and 
no longer as part of a theoretical, system which has been proved mistaken.
Some_ conclusions -
My purpose here is not simply to repeat myself, but to offer a 
synthetic, relatively self-explanatory, account of points, insights, 
implications and suggestions which are dispersed through my comments 
on the writers dealt with above, or which, "follow on" from them fairly 
unpr oblemat ically •>
If the "cultural study of music" is to vindicate itself in relation 
to the existing disciplines and sub-disciplines which deal with "the 
musical" (criticise,;, history aesthetics, sociology., musicology, psycho­
logy etc), then all the musical practices of each society be understood
first and foremost as practices. That is to say, musical practices, 
whether composition, performance, listening, improvisation, interpre­
tation, engineering, record-manufacture or even selling the drinks in 
the interval, have to be studied as a whole, in their inter-relations, 
as well as parts of social life as_ a whole« At the same time these wholes 
must not be seen as static, or pre-determined, but as produced and 
reproduced by the constituent practices concerned* And the ”totallising” 
impulse must not be permitted to prevent the investigation of the de­
tails and internal relations of each practice and artefact, since only 
in these are the determinants of that production and reproduction of 
the ”total” concretely available to be studied*
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I argue here that the artefacts of music, (instruments, scores, 
recording techniques etc) must be seen as objjqctifications of the 
practices of real, concrete men and women* This is not really so 
difficult to grasp* In addition, however, what we often call the 
*'performance' 1 of music is also the objectification of the practice 
of the performers and listeners involved* It is easy to forget that 
the ^intangible” sounds of musie-performed-and-heard are no less 
"material” than the instruments being used, though orally rather than 
visually perceived* The materi lity of music, not just sound, must be 
insisted upon in this precise sense - that is, it is the spninds that 
are material, but the musicfs ’Asocial reality” depends on the fact 
that there are sounds involved as a ^material sub-stratum”* The im­
portance of this point is not just logical but also polemical -
numerous influentail writers are either ambivalent or downright anti-
50materialist in this sense*'
However in the apparent physical immediacy of music-heard there 
is already a mediation* The sounds of an instrument, for example, 
are ‘'physical” or “material” certainly, but they are not ”natural” 
things, in the sense of occurring without human agency* They are 
objects ”'to> a social end” , and even though they pose, in their phy­
sical form, as "natural” they have meaning oily for so long as the 
social conditions of their social existence last* They are thus 
incapable of leaving their artefaction behind, and speaking the same 
message to a l l  people for all time* Indeed, strictly speaking, no 
two performances of any ”piece” are ever the same in any valid sense,
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whether to the musician (composer/improviser, performer of a ”work” or 
whatever) the•audience, or the media involved* Listening to music is 
always a creative^ process, and this is always mediated by the listener1s 
knowledge, or lack of knowledge of musical conventions, and by the place 
the ‘‘musical11 occupies in a structure of conscious ”subjectivity” and 
unconscious formations which is the listener’s ;’personality”. Again it 
is always r?placed11 by the social practices surrounding that act of 
listening which help to determine the listener’s ”subject-position” 
when the music startso There is no such thing as the ”open” ‘’indeter­
minate” response which permits nothing but the immanent qualities” 
of the music-heard to have an impact on the listening subject0 All 
listening has a social and psychological context.
Thus we can say that ”it takes two*7 to produce music. For the 
musical status of some sound-object to be constructed requires that 
someone else apart from its producer agrees that it is music. Of 
course individuals can carry this knowledge (of what the ’’musical” is) 
around in their heads, so as to hear, for example their own solitary 
whistling as music; but the knowledge is no less social for all that. 
Music (and I make no apology for speaking at a ”high level of abstrac­
tion” for the time being), is co-produced by its "producers” and 
listeners. To some extent the terminology of ‘‘communications theory” , 
in which ’’messages” are seen as existing solely insofar as they com­
prise relations between ‘’transmitters1’ and ’’receivers” comes close to 
describing the structural relationship I am trying to establish. How­
ever these terms, like my own abstract statements here, skate over, or 
disguise, an essential aspect of musical practices, as of all others - 
namely, the historical, or perhaps the ’’diachronic” aspect. We can 
perhaps begin to conceptualise this by arguing that, for a "receiver” 
in a particular society at a particular time, a certain musical ”heri- 
tage” exists as a "given” which he’’she has ”learnt” (not necessarily 
’’formally”), and which has become ”part of” what he/she is. I can 
respond to music produced and reproduced in social conditions which 
are continuous with my own (temporally and spatially) and I cannot 
respond (in a way bearing any determinate relation to the way a 
Venda will) to Venda music,to take Blacking’s excellent example.
However the internationalisation of economic and socio-political life
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characteristic of our epoch may rapidly produce a situation in which 
this latter inability of mine may cease to exist, in the same way as 
German and Italian ^Classical* music * which, when written, had a very 
local and class-specific audience (the upper classes of a few major 
European cities, particularly those of Germany, Austria, France and 
Italy as the "leading'' musical countries) has become part of many or 
even most persons5 Jfgiven?J to a greater or lesser extent, in contem­
porary Britian* This continuously-reproduced, continuity of musical 
practices means that new producers of music produce in an unwilled, 
inevitable relation to the J?given" which functions whether they are 
conscious of it nor not* Thus a composer may produce a "radically- 
newn score or recording, but only when listened to, and accorded 
meaningfulness (or meaninglessness) by audiences, is the production 
of music completed® And the Slgivens:? of the audiences cannot but 
intercept this listening and interpretation, and help determine its 
outcome® Furthermore, through the understanding of chiefly, psychology 
and socio-psychology as determinations of the moment of composition, 
we can see the operation of the composerfs J!given,f too® And all these 
givens are related, are parts of a heritage9tradition or language of 
music* The pro lerns of how to f5think17 such musical traditions or lan­
guages are immense and I will return to them below*
Another set of terms or categories which might be applied to 
musical practices, on the basis of what I have said so far is that 
of semiology - i*e* codes (encoding/decoding) and signs (signifier/ 
signified etc)* This terminology is of course derived from linguistic 
studies, and I would suggest that its usefulness for understanding any 
;isemiotic values*7 in music must be conditional on a more thorough work­
ing-out of the specificities of musical practices, and certainly cannot 
be read, from one field into the other in a simple way - though the ana­
logical use of semiological categories may help in this working-out* 
Likewise the relatively precise use of terms in wdiscourse-theoryi?, 
such as that of Foucault (as opposed to the legitimate use of such terms 
"loosely*7 and without claims of rigour) is something to be approached
gradually, if at all, with due concern for all the complexities invol-
??
ved, rather than something to be taken over and ;?used unproblematically 52
It is attractive to view "musics*7 as unified, structured systems 
of meaning, in which persons can work to produce messages meaningful to
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others, although not language-based and note directly translatable into 
language • Such a system is thought of as not a language but like lan­
guage in a vague sense - that is, in being ustructured communication11 • 
Such linguistic analogies have considerable currency among writers 
about music, and it would certainly be potentially helpful to be able 
to lean on them for analytical purposes® Music, like language, is
l?species-specific”" and "universal" - a "human” trait or characteristic® 
And it can be argued that musics develop like languages, by a process 
of conscious and unconscious innovations within a context of consciously
and unconsciously followed "rules* ® Again there are different musics 
co-existing at any given time, and familiarity with one gives no nece­
ssary access to the meaning of another® It is with all these charac­
teristics of music in mind that writers like Deryck Cooke are able to
argue that "Occidental" music is a language, in effect, with a vocabu­
lary of terms, and rules for their combination®
However I want to suggest that linguistic analogies in general 
should be used with very great caution for a number of reasons which 
I shall briefly sketch here® Firstly, language in much more complex 
than these analogies ever admits - even the attempts to apply advanced 
"code" and "signification" theories to music have to construct rela­
tively absti^aciwwl and static versions of these theories tearing them 
from their context and applying them as spjiegias to music® All theory 
develops in relation to its object and only if music had been included 
in the intended object of these theories all along could theliving, 
developing theory be made use of here, without modification®
•Secondly, some musics exist as practices in very different rjela- 
tionshi^s to other practices in a society from those to which ''we" in 
Britian now are accustomed® Indeed I will argue later that much "pop" 
can only be understood by reconceptualising the relationship of "listeners” 
to "musicians" and abandoning those preconceptions which ecce based on 
European and "traditional" assumptions about the roles of musicians, 
of listeners, of the "industry" and so on® Music explicitly played/" 
recorded for dancing to can clearly not be accounted for fully in 
Cooke*s terms, for example, even if they have a partial relevance® And 
when Blacking tells us that music among the Venda has celebratory ritual 
and even educational functions, we can see clearly how simplistic ideas
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based, on linguistic analogies are inadequate for understanding these.
Thirdly, if our “model” is language, what are we to make of the 
“fusions” -of elements from very different “cultures” which are charac­
teristic of contemporary popular music? Can we imagine African lan­
guages, English and German all mixed together and producing a “fusion” 
easily assimilable to all British kids, without formal or even informal 
teaching? And yet is this not what has come about in musical “languages” 
in about seventy years, or even less?
Other reasons why linguistic analogies are suspect could certainly 
be added. But I wish to go on here to a further aspect of the point 
I made above - namely that “it takes two” to make music. This unity of 
production and consumption is an abstraction, true of all social pro­
duction but telling us nothing of any particular type, phase or devel- 
mento That is, it is “ahistorical” as it stands. This unity may be on 
the “surface” of social life, to us looking at Veiida society. In our 
own society, however, it is very definitely not on the surface, and it 
can only be fully established, in 11 its ramifications, by “interro­
gating” many practices and institutions and by a sythesising of the 
results.
There is a simple level to this argument - that which refers to the 
size of the .music industry. A massive geographical and technical divi­
sion of labour in the production of musical artefacts, and a norm of
separation between production and consumption, both spatial and temporal -
these are inherent in mass production for a worldwide market and they do 
tend, in- t° disguise the fact that the central relationship 
towards which all this effort is bent is the (technically-mediated) 
sharing of a musical experience by producers and (many different) listeners. 
However the whole structure and economic :logic“ of this vast system Is 
what it _is not as a result of purely natural growth, or human ingenuity, 
but as part of an overall economic and social development based on 
commodity-production and under no overall human control. And the commo­
dity-form inserts its mystifying power between producer and consumer, 
and between both and their artefacts. Thus, while the scale of the 
contemporary music-industry requires the investigator to “third: big” , 
it is the fetishism and mystification, which cling to all commodities,
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which constitute the really chLffici^t problem* I will return to the 
particular problems of grasping the unity of this economic and social 
process in the area, of ''cultural goods” , and music in particular, in 
another context*
The sort of generalised, at times ahistorical, argument, which I 
have been laboriously working through here, constantly runs the risk 
of including or even basing itself on, unwarranted extrapolations from 
the supposed nature of "one* s own” musical experience to that of the 
"musical" as a whole* Ethnocentrism is as big a danger here as ahis- 
toricism - the attribution of permeance or even "naturalness” to what 
are actually characteristics of the musical practices of one time and 
place only* Are we to conclude, however, that we should not even try 
to "define" music or that the question of what, if anything, can be 
said to unite, say, Venda music with symphonic music is a non-question? 
Some radically materialist thinkers do indeed argue in these terms, 
believing that it follows from their claim that music has no "immanent 
laws”* Insofar as they grasp the potentially-infinite variety of possi­
ble musical practices they are right, and in their polemics against the
idea of music as "immaterial”' and "ideal”, they make excellent points*
53Both Shepherd and Wishart in "whose Music"? Come into this category 
to some degree* On the other hand we are justified in using one term - 
music - for an essential aspect of all these practices* This is true 
because, whatever else they are too, these practices are relationships 
between persons and "'nature"; to be more specific they are .all productive 
relationships with nature, the products being "sounds"' - i*e* material, 
though intangible things* Of course the sounds have meaning only in a 
social context; they are "’humanised objects" in the terminology of the 
young Marx* Without some notion of the social practice of music as the 
prodLuc_t_i_oil o f bnmiapii_se_d sourwl-ojojects^  out of ■ bipvbural; 1 objects v/e_ cppnnot 
j3ro£eedc
On the other hand this central relationship, which can so easily be 
dubbed "Man-Nature" and treated as a simple basis for further developments, 
is, in fact, no less of a "dialectical" and changing relationship than are 
many of the inter-subjective relationships of "musical life"* • In a very 
important sense the category "Nature" is itself a social category, as
Lukacs has pointed out One cannot posit a jpre-hi^man nature, or a nature
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excluding the human, except as that emptiest of abstractions, one which 
attempts to describe something into which human praxis and thought can 
enter into no relation* However there is an *''autonomous'1 aspect of 
“nature” in the sense in which the term is used here, namely that which 
emerges as a condition and consegmence^ of human praxis in “historical- 
time”; that which Sartre calls the ;;practico-dnert; 1 and which appears 
to concrete persons and. groups as a resistgjic_e_ in objects and even 
institutions which forces subsequent praxis along certain paths and 
closes off others* “Worked” matter does not 1osjq jits _noqi-himi3.n contejit 
in acquiring its human one, and this is the meaning of the limitations 
and the potentialities of instruments,of media, of recording techniques 
and so on* Thus although the very concept of Nature is meaningless 
except in relation to “Man” there is equally no basis for supposing 
that Nature is “just another5* social category, at the same “level of 
abstraction” as say “production” , or “association”* The Nature with 
v/hich “man” enters into a “dialectical” relationship, whose development 
comprises the marrow of history, is itself a unity comprising jfcwo terms - 
a socially^imjqrinteci^^character and an autonomous role, though the latter 
is realised only through, and in the historical development of praxis* 
This unity develops as a sort of groundbass to all social change* This 
is true, finally, because ”Man” is after all ”natural” though set against 
the remainder by a development which can be seen as natural or human de­
pending on the viewpoint - that is an ■ 'evolutionary’* one. Thus the real 
synthetic form of that dialectic which is all too often given as “Man 
versus Nature = History” (with a future re-harmonising posited as an ab­
stract possibility), is “Nature divided against itself, in which the 
humanly-appropriated moment acts “subjectively” on the rest (v/hich is 
non-human) making it its “object” of ”objectivity” so that both moments 
are progressively transformed till they harmonise once again, or, as
55Barnes writes in her introduction to Sartre*s “’Search for a Method”'"'" 
till “men and women will find that the image which their praxis has 
inscribed in the “pratico-inert” is in truth the reflection of their 
•freedom
The developing relationship between men and women and their “en­
vironment” as well as their own “nature”^to return to more conventional 
terms, constitutes a continuity which links all the social formations 
of historical time, and. which justifies such terms as “music” even when
applied to vastly different cultures. Musical practices can be repro­
duced in forms different in every way from the pre cedi nr; form, except 
insofar as they are new variations of sound-produc^icui resulting in 
sociek rneanings.. 'Thus one can speak of a fundamental category "music” 
and at the same time one cannot detect a 5 * natural musicality” underly­
ing a particular practice or cultural form, since the ‘’natural” compo­
nent develops from one form to the next as well as the "purely-social”e
A comparison (-strictly limited to this point in the argument) with sexu
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ality might be useful here. Theories like that of Marcuse, in which 
sexuality is a sort of seething cauldron off which the lid is lifted 
slightly to prevent the pressure becoming too great (- i.e. ‘''repressive 
tolerance”) implicitly posit a co_nstaj.it - the sex-drive - which. plops 
not change in hist or ical t ime, though the forms through which it is 
both "expressed” and '"‘controlled”' develop and change indefinitely.
This is too mechanical to provide an adequate tool for analysing com­
plex changes in sexual practices and discourses« On the other hand an 
analysis which consider sexuality only as "discourse”, and does not 
enter the problem of the dialectics of "human-nature”, (on the grounds 
that id ’"‘does not exist” or that it is indeed "constant”) is, though 
superficially subtler in one respect, no more complete0 ‘Human-nature5?
is a term which has lent itself to major ideological distortion, chiefly 
the pretence that its "unchangeable" characteristics directly justify 
aspects of the present social formation. Nonetheless a d_eprejlonijig 
"nature” of human beings exists, as can be shown by anthropological 
comparisons in relation to the ”balance of the senses” and other 
"faculties” and ‘'traits’'* at the interface, as it were, of the physio­
logical and the cultural. Again the existence of what Freud calls 
the ”sub-conscious”, even if we have to reconceptualise it very con­
siderably, is clearly evidence on this question. Musicality and sexu­
ality are not directly comparable iji_a_gy way except this, but in tjiis 
precise sense, their investigation ought to shed light, each on the 
other, and on aspects of this "human-nature” problem.
Musical instruments are .artefacts, and as such pieces of "worked 
matter'1'. They "alienate” their users and audiences as a result - not 
by any ahistorical anti-human character, not as timeless ontological 
limits on human-ness, but as coimterweights to human freedom. This 
means that, in the nature of social development, up tonow and for the
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immediately-fore seeable _f u ture, worked matter itself restricts further 
praxis* As a result "lines" or '-'directions** of development of the rela­
tionships between humans and "nature" (as explained above) come into 
existence* If there is any validity in Marx's famous "base-superstruc­
tureanalogy, it may well be these lines and directions, (which are 
cJLso nclosures^’) that constitute the "base"* They are the "productive 
forces"', and as we see they are r_elgL_ti_o_nshij)_s too, and not 'entities" 
as some critics of Marx profess to find* The famous dictum used by 
Engels, "Freedom is the recognition of necessity" can also be seen to 
have a subtle and dialectical meaning in the context*
All the techniques of musical production and reproduction are 
"worked matter" and thus appear as resistances to production as well 
as its tools* They are, in other words fundamentally ambiguous* This 
ambiguity is itself a deycfojoing relationship* The technology which 
afflicts one group as a "dead hand" may be given a new and "revolutionary" 
meaning by another, and will be changed and re-developed accordingly*
The microphone which so horrified one group of singers in the earlier 
years of this century, came as a great bocr_ to others, who were prepared 
to experiment and to imagine different relationships between singer and 
"accompaniment"* On the other hand if it had been invented considerably 
earlier or later we could not expect the same social development of new 
musical practices to have taken place*
If I am right in the main line of my argument, about the "musical" 
as a relationship between men and women and "Nature" (as qualified), 
then it is reasonable to expect a provisional definition of this rela­
tionship to be possible* The production of sound is clearly an element 
of this definition, and thd "organising" of these sounds is clearly 
essential too - as the condition of their acquiring a social meaning*
Some musicologists and aesthetic-philosophers insist that only the 
production of fipeed , i*e* repeatable, intervals qualifies as music, 
but I see no reason to include this criterion at the level of general 
definition. A point which escapes the notice of some such writers but 
which does seem to me to be of cardinal importance, however, is the 
tgxpooraligby of music* Some durational character is necessary to the 
definition* Unlike the "fixed intervals" appracoh, I think the insis­
tence on temporality in music is fundamental for the simple reason that 
"time" is another one of the 'natural" components involved, and therefore,
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although musical practices may vary enormously in their articulation of 
time, as of sound the two components, transformed appropriately, will 
always be present. I am not arguing here at the general philosophical 
level at which no phenomenon is conceivable except "in" time in some 
way, but at a particular level ~ musical practice takes a bit of time, 
so to speak, and rppr_e_at_es_ it as or, imposes on, and into it a flow of 
soundso 5‘Musicaljiiaterial*; is definecl in other w o r d s ,_ by its audibility 
its Immemi-sajxian and itjs duration^ and the bringing of _tjiese_ elements _into_ 
relationsliips with each other, jAvich modify each in turn.
I should mention here that the "organisation" to which I refer above 
does not imply that only that product whose every detail has been planned, 
which has a definite, calculated "beginning, middle and end” etc, is 
musical. Loose organisation of sounds, the "building-in" of chance 
elements as in some avant-garde compositions, the mixture of pre-planned 
(loose) structure and immediate improvisation, which is found in jazz 
and some other musics, - all of these can be included in my category 
"organisation” which only refers to the broad "work” done on sound-objects 
by concrete persons and groups to make them meaningful, a "work" which 
always involves creating either "pattern" or a studied lack of pattern 
which relies on the contrast v/ith a pattern for its effect 0 But I am 
getting ahead of myself here, and introducing terms and ideas which 
belong to a later part of my argument.
There are more, and more complex, problems involved in these highly 
generalised areas I have been discussing, but I cannot discuss all of 
them in this context. The totality of what I have to say here on music 
and musicality in general can on no way pose as even the beginnings of, 
let alone the full outline of a philosophy or aesthetic theory of music. 
I have tried on the contrary to restrict myself to those points without 
which the plunge into the study of contemporary and recent popular music 
would be sure to lead to a. rapid drowning. I hope I have not left out 
too much of relevance.
At this point I would like to move on to an area of theoretical 
problems which impinges on every point of my argument up to now. It is 
once again quite impossible for me to have the last word on it here, 
but it is essential that I cover it nonetheless. I am referring to the
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cluster of problems that usually go under the title of "relative autonomy'*• 
We can propose the general relative autonomy of all social practices 
in the simple sense that, in the course of their developing existence, 
they outstrip always any total-determination-by-something-else which 
we might try to "read into1* them* However, where and how are we to 
specify the relative autonomy of musical practices? What I have written 
above about "definition" might be said to point to the "specificity" of 
the "musical5** But it does no fully answer this question*
Many writers accord an autonomy to "the work'"’ of music* It is, 
they say, "timeless" and has an "essence" which sqiryiyes each particu­
lar performance* This "autonomy" is virtually an absolute one - its only 
"condition of existence" being that the work is composed in the first 
place* Once this is done it floats through history, immutable and 
cannot be destroyed* I believe that this view is an illusion rooted 
irinotation* It is probably no accident that this quasi-religious 
view of the "autonomous work" is, as far as I can discover, peculiar 
to Occidental cultures of the last four or five centuries* It is rooted 
in the fact that musical notation, (like phonetic literacy) having ori­
ginated as a simple mnemonic for the convenience of performers, enabled 
a written set of signs to survive its writing in time and in space 
(copying), to take on an existence indejoendent of its writer* This 
"score"’ could then be "interpreted" by a musician who knew its "rules" 
and the resulting sounds were taken, with some sort of "rough" justice, 
to in a s e n s e , a reconstitution of the original ones* From here it 
was a small step, of "abstraction”, to the conclusion that the two per­
formances were of the "same music" in other words of something which 
existed jpotenti illy, or was present though not realised, between per­
formances* Of course the only thing which really existed between per­
formances was the score, but that idealistic thinking which considers 
the abstract "entity" to be the "real" has never been in short supply; 
and indeed the history of association between music and religdori (and 
ritual) had also left a residue of mysteriousness in the category "rausic5^  
as had Pythagorean mysticism centred around the har_monic sejrie_5o Actually 
of course no two performances are ever the same, for two principal reasons; 
firstly, in terms of sound-production itself they can never be identical, 
though this can often seem to be a negligible hair-splitting point* 
Secondly, the music is not the sounds-in-themselves, as we have already
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seen® It is only the socially-created meaningfulness of the sounds 
which distinguishes music from natural noises® This means that the 
listeners co-produce the music by perceiving meanings therin, even 
though only the performer is producing the sou rids® The fundamental 
reason why musical works cannot be accorded a. ''timeless essence'1 is, 
therefore, that the jmcliencjss change, and different audiences ”get 
out" different meanings from the ”same” work*
Like every other generalisation in my argument, this abstractly- 
logical reasoning for the falseness of the "timeless essence” view 
actually requires knowledge of the particularities of "concrete"1 situ­
ations if it is to be fully appreciated® The contemporary situation 
is complicated by the fact that as well as scores we now have another 
kind of artefact, which fixes a partj._cnl_ar pe_i^ fo_rrnance_ in an apparently 
timeless way, and this appears to have gone beyond the element of 
intjerjgrglabi 1 i, ty in the score - namely records (and tapes)® In fact 
of course both, the points made above still apply, and the first, which 
might have seemed trivial in relation to scores, becomes more important 
as the control over sound-production afforded to musicians by new 
electronic techniques brings previously-neglected nuances of pitch and 
timbre into the centre of musicians1 and listeners' attention®
The "autonomy of the work”, which has seemed virtually absolute 
to many aestheticians proves to be a very relative thing, characteris­
tic in the first place, of the period of the predominance of the score 
a s the technical basis of musical reproduction® It is capably of 
affecting the uses made of ”new media”,. however, and of surviving that 
period® The record is capable of preserving the more or less "perfect” 
performance of a notated work, and is indeed widely used for this pur­
pose; but it is also capable of capturing the live performance, the 
improvisation and the error, practices with little or nothing to do 
with the '’reified” work® In addition to this, the techniques of the 
recording studio permit the alteration, beyond recognition, of the 
sounds the "musicians**2 as traditionally defined, initially produce 
from their instruments and voices® Thus the roles of composer.per­
former and critical listener all enter a single collectivised process 
of production, and cease to exist in the separated for;: characterstic 
of the production of notched music® The.potentialities of electrical 
reproduction clearly point beyond the practices which gave rise to the 
idealised view of the "autonomous work”, but the realisation of these 
potentialities is a contradictory and in no sense an inevitable, develop­
ment®
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We should remember that, insofar as the musicians and listeners 
in the period of efficacy of an idea believe^ in it the.mselves i t  has 
a certain effect on the practice. Composers have actually striven to 
encode their purposes and meanings so completely and clearly as to 
brook no misunderstanding. They hold only one interpretation of the 
work to be correct. The same idea has had an effect in "criticism" - 
chiefly in the belief that works are "great" if they have this imperious 
quality of imposing themselves on listeners apparently unequivocally. 
Beethoven is widely held to be the master of this sort of composition. 
Finally it has an effect on listeners, namely the sort of humility which 
prevents some people from responding to music "unselfconsciously”, 
because they are acutely conscious of their (formal) ignorance of its 
"rules” and take this to be an ignorance of musical meaning as a whole.
If the idea of the autonomy of the work is conditional on certain 
practices, principally the predominance of the score, then v/hat of the 
idea of the "autonomous tradition”’ in music? This idea, which is taken 
for granted in many histories, and defended by may aestheticians and 
critics, is, in its simple form nothing more than the claim that compo­
sers and performers of music learn from each other at a "technical” 
level (and perhaps at a "spiritual" level too), and that the sum of 
their productions can be seen, therefore, as a continuum or "tradition"'. 
A t this level the idea is fairly straightforward, as long as we remember 
that other determinants, apart from a predecessor1s techniques, will 
always register in musical production too. However the idea is rarely 
to be found in this simple form in music-histories and criticisms.
Almost always it is mixed up with, firstly, qualitative judgements 
about the degree of success of this "’learning"; secondly, narrowly- 
idealist views of v/hat "history of music "consists of; and thirdly, a 
tendency to confound the particular ""autonomous" lineage in question 
for the general relative autonomy of all musical practices - i.e. to 
say "'musical autonomy is heqqq, and Jlherj3ib_re_,_ _no_v/_here_ j^lse". This 
denial of real autonomy to other musics apart from one!s "own" is found 
spelt out clearly in Adorno, but it is also the disguised content of 
other athnocentric and elitist -arguments, which use different terms 
but essentially refer to the same central points.
The first error of mixing up technical detective-work with aesthetic 
judgement is most frequently encountered in thos books which pre?-select the
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compositions whose study exposes the lineage, excluding any which suggest 
alternative approaches. It is thus that "serious" music is often first 
constructed as a category. The second error is the first writ large 
a second "tradition" - that of the "great" music - emerges from the 
first and music history is seen as a series of "great" eminences sep­
arated by other names and works of purely or primarily "technical" in­
terest, as precursors or imitations of the great works themselves® The 
third error associates the idea of autonomous music with what I described 
above as the effeetiveness of the idea of the timeless essence of the 
work, believing that only the music for which great concert halls, opera 
houses and training academies are built is taken seriously "in ikself", 
and other musics, which involve ritual or educational or dance purposes, 
are not really autonomous at alia This error naturally considers "’abso­
lute" music (symphonies, concertos and chamber music) as the highest 
type, is prepared to admit church music, because of its lofty purpose, 
to the canon, and is somewhat condescending to opera, marvelling at how 
such a "ludicrous form" has given rise to excellent (by the "'absolute" 
standar ;) music. This approach naturally considers non-notated music 
as incapable of possessing the "logic"', the structure, the combination 
of complexity and definiteness of "truly autonomous"’ music and therefore
as inferior o As a matter of fact the music of Bali in Indonesia as de-
58scribed in Small,'" xs evidence for the falseness of this view, as is 
the rhythmic complexity found in many a "primitive" music (eg. of the 
Indian sub-continent and of Africa) but rarely approached by the 
"classical"' tradition.
The location of a "’relative autonomy^a" in the technical inheri­
tances passed on from musicians and audiences to their successors seems 
to me to be a just argument as long as it is kept separate from the 
errors outlined above. Such autonomy is conditional on some stability 
or continuity of audience, and of norms of musical training. But the 
very core of the autonomy concept lies in the insight that changes in 
the audiences or the norms over a period do not destroy at s^troke 
the conditions of existence for the continued meaningbalness of old 
music, but rej)_rqduce them or reconstruct them so that the meaningfulness 
lives on in altered form. Of course changes may be so big that the 
tradition is effectively wiped out, but even then v/hatever musical prac­
tices succeed this collapse will bear the marks of its particular charac­
ter in some way.
-  6k  -/
Adorno believed he was witnessing in his lifetime the collapse of 
European ”autonomous music” and the spread of ”light” and ;’popular” 
musical types which rested on a different (less concentrated, sustained 
and exclusive) ”mode of listening5'. He s a u  the abstract possibility 
of a new autonomous music, whose autonomy would have to be appreciated 
in a radically different way, and he also saw the real possibility that 
”jazz” could evolve into an imitation of classical music, with rules,
academies and intelligentsia to match. But he thought neither of these 
developments was likely because the direction in which listening v/as 
changing, combined with the development of the music-industry towards 
monopoly and mass-production, suggested a further ^regression” a 
further development of ”deconcentration” and attitudes ”akin to 
sports-enthusiasm” among listeners. He was apparently deaf to the
genuinely new and ^creative” elements in the Afro-American and popular
musics all around him, except insolar as he grudgingly granted ”talent” 
to a few musicians in order the more to condemn their prostitution of 
it. I believe that Adorno is guilty of the error, identified above, 
which consists of believing the ‘’autonomy” of one’s own preferred music 
to be the acme of musical autonomy as a whole. Other musics are inevi­
tably considered inferior in this view However, we can separate his 
error in this respect from much of the rest of his argument, which then 
becomes a challenge to prove him wrong - to show that the popular music 
of our age is, or at any rate includes a type of resistance to the 
pressures of ”massification” ^atomisation” and so on which he identifies, 
a way of winning, and humanising a ”space” , for the enjoyment of an 
”immediate” social life even in the face of that invasion of all rela­
tions by the commodity-form he describes.
To return to the ”autonomous tradition” I must point out again that 
we can posit a continuity of technical developments, dependent on certain 
conditions of existence. But this is not the be-all and end-all of the 
relative autonomy of musical practices* Even where such always-precarious 
continuities are disrupted, or exploded outwards by contact with others, 
(as happened to European popular music in this century, perhaps) musical 
practices will always exhibit an autonomy in relation to other practices, 
by virtues of their very existence. The problem that can deal a deathblow 
to ”the musical”' is the collapse of any audience capable of completing 
the construction of its meaningfulness. A problem of the development of
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popular music in this century is precisely how to ^ ?ncej:tjmlise 
1  istening' which is wtechnic allj ^ . c-aJ^bA e..,-Q-f- 
p_ace__ y n th_this epcplosioji of techniques and i?musical language*’ which 
amounts to a fusion of elements from at least two very different 
cultures, one originating in Europe but divided into'several strands, 
the other Afro-American and also far from fully unified* One thing 
is clear, however when the question is posed in this way, and that 
is that ^regression'"’ is in no way an appropriate description of the 
development*
I wrote in the introduction that my eventual aim,which had at 
first been confused and contradictory, was eventually to integralte 
the study of pop history with the work on theory and method which I 
have introduced here* I can now add to this that my particular object 
of attention will be a moment of pop history, chosen both for its 
documentation, which gives us the material to work with (the "secondary 
sources1* as well as the primary) and for wliat it is_supposed to repre­
sent - a great explosion of new ;isounds;;, a new sociological phenomenon 
(??youth;? and "youth-culture?i - the latter meaning chiefly music (and 
clothes) to the outsider), and a new step in the internationalisation 
of the music industry and of the S,'tastes’; of audiences* In a moment 
of obvious shake_-up and reconstiaiction of all the practices of popular 
music the truth, the limitations and the basis of a critique of the 
Adorno view - as the most sophisticated in existence - ought to be more 
readily discoverable than in less perturbed periods* If all is not 
deception the mid-1950s in US and, in g^qitian saw a gigantic wave of 
amateurmusic-making among young (chiefly male) people* This was not 
family-based as was the old amateurism of the ^middle-classes'*, but 
"group-based** generated out of neighbourhood friendships, gangs, schools, 
particulcir coffee-bars and even workplaces etc* It could be interpreted, 
in Adorno fs terms, in two ways;- either as the basest form of mass -imitation 
of the commodities offered, some strange quirk of the mass-society (a 
bit like football-fans thinking they themselves are Best or Francis when 
they play in the park), or as proof that all is _not as Adorno says* The 
very idea of kids listening so hard to records that they learn to play and 
sing in a more or less identical way, the idea of kids getting together 
to make music, and learning to rely on each other as parts of an ensemble
or group - these might be taken ho strike at the very heart cf Adorno*s 
claims about regressive listening and atomisation respectively,, My 
purpose is to study both the history and the theory of this problem - 
to attempt to prove that the second interpretation has some truth, to 
work out how much 3 and to develop a view of pop-musical practices as 
a whole which includes these dimensions* It is to these ends that I 
intend to try to apply elsewhere the theoretical considerations set 
out above»
-  66 .
Notes and References
1.
2.
3.
k.
3.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1 0 . 
11. 
12.
1 3 .
Meyer B "Emotion and Meaning in Music", Chicago 1956.
"Explaining Music", University of California, 1973. &
Langer S.K. "Philosophy in a New Key", Harvard University, i960.
Shepherd J., Virden P, Vulliamy G, and Wishart T ,: "Whose Music?,
a Sociology of Musical Languages", London 1977,
Meyer, 1973^ , p 14.
The Language of Music, Deryck Cooke, OUP 1959.
John Blacking: "How Musical is Man?" Washington 1973.
Eg. A.P, Merriam: "The Anthropology of Music", Evanston 196 ,^
Maxim Gorki; "Articles and Pamphlets", Moscow 1950.
Christopher Landwell:, "Illusion and Reality", Lawrence & Wishart, 1973. 
Ernst Fischer: "The Necessity of Art", Penguin 196 3.
G.N.F. Hegal: "Philosophy of Art", Routledge 1892.
J.P. Sartre: "Search for a Method", N.Y. 196 3.
Dilthey, Wilkelm: "Von Deutscher Dichting and Musik", Leipzig 1933.
"Der Aufbam der geschichtlichen Welt in den 
Geisteswissenschaften", Leipzig 1927.
"Einfurhrung in die Geisteswissenschafter 1923.
See also "Wilhelm Dilthey: an Introduction" and
"The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey" both by 
T.A. (?) Hodges (19^+ and 1952)
Contained in the invaluable "Introduction" to "Music and Society:
The Later Writings of Paul Honigsheim" ed. K.P.E. Etzkorn.
I have relied on Etzkorn for information on these and other un- 
transulated works.
These ideas from Dilthey 1927 & 1933.
15* Routledge and Kegan Paul 19 78.
16. 1882, translated K.P.E. Etzkorn, 1964.
Quoted from Etzkornrs account of Simmel in "Music and Society".
Max Weber; "The Rational and Social Foundation of Music", 
translated and edited by Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel and 
Gertrude Neuwirth, 1958.
19• K.P.E. Etzkorn: "Introduction" to "Music and Society".
20. See Wilfrid Mailers: "Caliban Reborn", Victor Goll'ancz, 1968.
Kurt Blankopf: "New Patterns of Musical Behaviour"
Christopher Small: "Music-Society-Ed'ucation" London 1977*
Richard Middleton: "Pop Music and the Blues".
(None of these is a "racist book", but each discusses the theory 
more or less sympathetically, while appreciating the greater 
complexity and intractability of the real situation).
21. Aphons Silbermann; "The Sociology of Music", London 1963.
"Bildschirm and WirklichkeitBerlin 1966.
22. T.W. Adorno: "Theses on the Sociology of Art", V/PCS2,
(translated Brian Trench).
23. I will return to this argument of Adorno’s below.
24. All these are discussed and referenced in Etzkornfs "Introduction".
25* "Whose Music", as referenced above, Note 2.
26. Berger P.L. and Luckmann T., "The Social Construction of Reality",
Penguin 1967*
27. McLuhan, Mar shall: "The Gutenberg Galaxy", Toronto, 1962.
28. Bloch, Marc, "Feudal Society", Routledge, 1961,
29. Leavis F.R., "Two Cultures", 1962, London.
& Thompson, Denys (ed) "Discrimination and Popular 
Culture", London 1964. *
30. For a rehearsal of all these arguments viz. II. Pans "Popular
Cultures in America: Social Problem in a Mass Society or 
Social Asset in a Pluralist Society" in Becker H S (ed), 
"Social Problems: a Modern Approach", John Wiley, 1967
31. Adorno wrote many articles and books on music. The following
are the ones I have used here
1) (with Hookheimer, M) "Dialectic of Enlightenment", 
translated by John Cumming, N.Y., Seabury Press, 1972.
2) "Introduction to the Sociology of Music", Seabury 1976.
3) "Negative Dialectics", Seabury ’73.
*0 "On Popular Music", - in "Studies in Philosophy and 
Social Sciences, Vol IX, 1941, pps 17-48.
5) "Philosophy of Modern Music", translated by Anne G . 
Mitchell and W.V. Blomster, Seabury 1973*
6) "Prisms", Translated by S & S Weber, Spearman, 1967.
7) "A Social Critique of Radio Music", Kenyon Review,
Vol VIII, No 2 (1945).
8) "Theses on the Sociology of Art", WPCS2, transl B. Trencb
9) "On the Fetish-character in Music and the Regression of 
listening" in "'The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed 
by A. Arato and.E Gebhardt, NY 1978.
32. "Philosophy of New Music" - Introduction.
33. ibid.
34. "Whose Music", p 239•
35. "Philosophy of New Music".
36. "Intodtiction to the Sociology of Music".
37. "Philosophy".
38. All references on pps 29, 30-37 are from this essay,
39. From here on references are separate again.
40. "Grundrisse", Penguin/NLR 1973. pps 89-93.
41. ibid.
